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Abstract 
This document analyses development banking in Jamaica, identifying its 
weaknesses and proposes solutions to address its shortcomings. The first part 
of the document provides an overview of development banking in developing 
economies. The second part, “The Jamaican Experience of Development 
Banking” examines the modus operandi of all Jamaica’s post - Independence 
developmental institutions. The Jamaican experience substantiates the 
conclusions as to the desultory performance of development banking in the 
developing world. The third part “Financial Deepening in Jamaica”, seeks to 
address the question “how to rectify this situation” Accordingly, it considers 
first how Jamaica’s development banks might access the international capital 
markets and hence raise fresh capital in the same manner as their counterparts 
in developed countries. A condition precedent to such a step would be the 
need to “clean up their balance sheets”. However, it should be borne in mind 
that it would be impossible to keep their balance sheets clean, operating on 
the high risk/ low return principle. In making suggestions for the expansion 
of the range of financial products offered by the development banks, the 
document points out the need for legislation to make it easier to transfer 
financial ownership to creditors and for the establishment of a credit bureau 
to improve access to financial information. It also identifies new financial 
products. More importantly, to illustrate a proposal that Jamaica’s main 
development bank assume the role of a corporate financier, it likens the 
institution to a multi-story building, each of whose floors represents a 
particular level of appetite for risk. Thus, the top floors represent “secured 
debt” whilst, at the other end of the scale, the ground floor represents equity. 
The intervening floors represent “Mezzanine or Quasi Equity Financing” 
including commercial loans, preference shares etc. This illustration sets the 
stage for what the paper argues in “The Way Forward for Development 
Banks”. In short, the proposal is that the development bank should switch its 
modus operandi to that of a Venture Capital Corporation (VC). 
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1. Stylized facts of development 
banking  
What is development banking? 
Kane (1975) defines the Development Bank (DB) as “a financial 
intermediary supplying long- term funds to bankable economic 
development projects and providing related services”, while Panizza 
(2004) highlights considerations of externalities: DBs are “financial 
institutions primarily concerned with offering long-term capital finance to 
projects generating positive externalities and hence under financed by 
private creditors.” Clearly, Kane’s definition and that of the IDB’s 
Panizza, some 30 years later, are both insistent on the paramount 
importance of the long term lending role of the DB. However, it is 
submitted that the “real essence” of development banking was identified 
much earlier by Joseph Schumpeter in his book, “The Theory of 
Economic Development”, published in German in 1912 but only 
published in English in 1934.In vivid language, Schumpeter argues that 
banking and entrepreneurship are the two key agents in the process of 
economic development. He is one of the earliest to contend that financial 
development causes economic development, as financial markets promote 
growth by funding entrepreneurs and channelling capital to high return 
projects. 
9 
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The origin of development banking 
Development banking began in Continental Europe, where universal (industrial or credit) banks 
were formed first in France, with the Credit Mobilier in 1852, and then more successfully in 
Germany and Italy, explicitly to support industrialization through providing large amounts of 
financing to growing industries. These precursors of the modern development bank were created by 
countries engaged in a catching up process, who held the view that gradual accumulation of capital 
over many years out of retained earnings i.e. the British model, would be inadequate. European 
enterprises were much younger, but were faced with larger, more sudden capital requirements, such 
as building a modern steel or textile mill. Moreover, the large capital requirements to build utilities 
such as railways could have been raised only with difficulty in Continental Europe, as unlike 
Britain, they lacked a large prosperous middle class and developed stock markets. 
The German experience 
In his seminal work “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays” 
published in 1962, the economic historian, Alexander Gershenkron, argued that the banking system 
had played a key role at certain stages of the European industrialization process, pointing out that, 
when Britain industrialized, technology was small scale and, hence, institutionally not very 
demanding. These conditions were radically altered in the nineteenth century when Germany, his 
favourite example, started to catch up. This was due to what Gerschenkron described as the 
seemingly inbuilt tendency of modern technology to require ever larger and more complex plants 
(static and dynamic economies of scale) with similarly changing requirements with respect to the 
physical, financial and institutional infrastructure. He argued that, because of the high potential 
rewards from successful entry, and the heavy modernization pressure it helped to generate in the 
rest of the economy, it was of paramount importance for the latecomer to target such progressive, 
dynamic industries, and compete globally through investing in the most modern equipment and 
plants. He attributed Germany’s success in achieving rapid development to its banking system, 
which he viewed as the primary source of capital and entrepreneurship: “The focal role in capital 
provision in a country like Germany must be assigned not to any original capital accumulation but 
to the role of credit creation policies on the part of the banking system”. 
Drawing from the German experience, Gerschenkron drew the following conclusions: 
• it is “largely by the application of the most modern and efficient techniques that backward 
countries could hope to achieve success, particularly if their industrialization proceeded in 
the face of competition from the advanced country.”(9). 
• To succeed in catching-up, countries had to build up new “institutional instruments for 
which there was little or no counterpart in the established industrial country” (p. 7). The 
purpose of these institutional instruments would be to mobilize resources to undertake the 
necessary changes at the new and radically enlarged scale that modern technology 
required. 
• The more backward the country, the greater the need for banking to supply both capital 
and entrepreneurship. 
In his 1968 work ”Continuity in History and Other Essays”; Gerschenkron addressed the 
issue of the other essential ingredient of development banking i.e. entrepreneurship, when he argued 
that: 
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• The inadequacy in the number of available entrepreneurs could be remedied or substituted 
for by increasing the size of plant and enterprise above what would otherwise have been 
an optimal size. Once again using the German experience, he points out that the various 
shortcomings of individual entrepreneurs were offset by the device of splitting the 
entrepreneurial function. As suggested above, the German investment banks – a powerful 
invention, comparable in economic effect to that of the steam engine – were in their 
capital - supplying functions a substitute for the insufficiency of the previously created 
wealth willingly placed at the disposal of the entrepreneurs. But they were also a 
substitute for entrepreneurial deficiencies. From their central vantage points of control, the 
banks participated actively in shaping the major – and sometimes even not so major – 
decisions of the individual enterprises. It was they who very often mapped out a firm’s 
paths of growth, conceived far-sighted plans, decided on major technological and 
locational innovations, and arranged for mergers and capital increases.” In short, 
the German investment banks actively participated in the entrepreneurial ventures 
which they financed. This is a point to be noted by present day development banks.   
Development banking in developing countries 
The Gerschenkron hypothesis, extolling the virtues of the European model, received considerable 
academic attention in the late 1960s and 1970s,at the same time as many development banks were 
being set up by the newly independent countries, often with help from the World Bank. However, it 
should be borne in mind that the development of modern financial systems in the industrial 
countries took place in an environment vastly different from that in which developing countries’ 
financial systems have developed. To be specific, prior to the Great Depression in 1929-1933, most 
governments intervened neither in macroeconomic management of the economy, nor in special 
regulation of the financial sector. This distinct trend towards universal banking was stopped by the 
regulations introduced everywhere in the 1930s. However, in the 1970s, when some of the 
regulation of the 1930s was relaxed, this trend re-emerged. 
More recently the Gerschenkron hypothesis has been called into question by policy advisers, 
who have asserted that financial institutions under the control of industrial conglomerates worsen 
resource allocation. In his second edition of Money, Banking and Development 1995, Pg.301, the 
late Professor Maxwell Fry observed “The apparent conflict with the historical experience of 
Europe lies in the fact that conglomeration in the developing countries is often strongly motivated 
by the desire to avoid interest rate ceilings and other regulations on lending, such as credit ceilings.”  
In addition, according to Fry, Pg 302 “Four key differences should be borne in mind when 
comparing the financial systems of most developing countries with industrialized countries’ 
financial systems. First, financial markets are oligopolistic in most developing countries, whereas 
they are competitive in most industrialized countries, particularly so in the United States. Second, 
although detailed regulations concerning financial transactions exist in all countries, they are 
generally enforced much more consistently and effectively in the developed than in the developing 
countries. The same regulations on paper may be quite different in practice. Third, dis-
intermediation in the developed countries implies substitution from indirect to direct financial 
claims. In most developing countries, it implies substitution into tangible assets used as inflation 
hedges. Hence, national savings ratios may be unaffected by deposit ceilings in industrialized 
countries but be affected by them in developing countries. Finally, the driving force behind the 
recent wave of financial innovations and reforms in the industrialized countries may well have been 
market forces in the face of the worldwide inflationary surge of the 1970s, whereas the ideas of 
Ronald McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) have had substantial impact 0n developing countries, 
perhaps most obviously in the policy recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank”. 
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Fry (Pg 303) continues by drawing a distinction between postwar financial development in 
developing countries and that of developed countries: “Postwar financial development in 
developing countries differs in several important respects from financial development in the 
industrialized countries. First, the pace has been forced in developing countries, with government 
intervention occurring with increasing frequency. There has been a strong tendency towards 
increasing government ownership of financial institutions in developing countries over the past two 
decades”. This leads inevitably to the question: Are state owned development banks a long term 
development finance solution? And further: Has over-concentration of development banking 
ownership in Government hands hindered financial development? 
Fry does however acknowledge there are significant similarities between banking in 
developing and developed countries, when he continues “An important parallel between nineteenth-
century Europe and many post-war developing countries lies in the banks’ involvement in 
government finance. Nineteenth century Austrian banks focused their attentions on financing the 
government’s perennial deficits. The same happened in Italy, Serbia and Spain. Banks in Austria, 
Italy and Spain took the easy path of lending to finance large government deficits. These examples 
from nineteenth century Europe bear more than a passing resemblance to many developing 
countries today. Government policy and government finance had as large an impact in molding the 
structure of financial systems in nineteenth – century Europe as they had in the postwar period in 
developing countries. Cameron’s comment on Serbia (1972, 21) drives home the point, when he 
argues “the privileged position of the government in the capital market, and its penchant for 
unproductive expenditures – just as that of Austria, Italy and Spain – made it difficult for the 
banking system to contribute to industrial development”. The parallels between these observations 
and the position in Jamaica and other developing countries today is self-evident. 
Development finance institutions (DFI’s) 
From its creation in 1944, and for the first four decades of its existence, the World Bank was the 
leading supporter worldwide of development finance institutions (DFIs). Indeed, it should be noted 
that, although the first wave of World Bank reports on the financial sectors of developing countries, 
written in the late 1970s and early 1980s, concentrated mainly on microeconomic and sectoral 
issues, these reports often advocated the adoption of universal banks at the institutional level. It 
therefore seems appropriate to quote from the World Bank’s seminal World Development Report of 
1989 (WDR 1989) to define DFIs. According to WDR 1989, pg 106:  
“The most common type of non-bank intermediary in developing countries is the 
development finance institution (DFI). Most are public or quasi-public institutions that derive much 
of their funding from the government or from foreign assistance. Originally they were intended to 
provide small and medium – size enterprises with the long - term finance that the commercial banks 
would not supply. During the 1970s the mandate was broadened to include the promotion of 
priority sectors. Using government funds, DFIs extended subsidized credit to activities judged 
unprofitable or too risky by other lenders.” 
After World War II, the lack of long - term funding for investment projects encouraged many 
countries to establish development finance institutions (DFIs) by using public funds to fill what was 
identified as a financing gap. The evolution of the terminology of development institutions has 
included “development finance companies” (DFCs) or corporations defined as public entities with 
non- banking activities, “development funds” (often funded through special accounts at the Central 
Bank) and “national development banks” (NDBs).  
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It is not entirely accurate to regard the term, NDB, as being roughly interchangeable with the 
term, DFC (which excludes key banking activities), particularly when quoting from earlier writers 
on development. The term DFI is more correctly used to include a greater number entities than only 
NDBs, and we shall use it specifically to include the relevant “special” funds targeted at financing 
development, such as those used to finance small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in Jamaica. 
The most common form of DFI is the national development bank (NDB). The NDB typically 
provides long - term finance for development projects for the industrial or agricultural sectors. The 
central role in economic development assumed by most developing country governments for most 
of the post war period required them to set up institutions to identify, appraise, promote, finance and 
implement investment projects - in short, a national development bank, which became an instrument 
of government policy expected to act in the country’s long term developmental interests. Virtually 
every developing country has at least one DFI, most often a NDB, whilst many countries, like 
Jamaica, have several.  
Another key role of DFIs is to fill “gaps” in the capital markets through mobilizing capital for 
investment. Kitchen (1986) observes “ In countries where financial institutions are limited in 
number and limited in vision regarding their lending policies, where entrepreneurial activity is 
largely concentrated on activities which provide quick returns, such as trading, and where security 
for loans may be limited, then DFCs are probably a necessity. The conditions described prevail in a 
large number of developing countries, of course”. 
Why have so many countries set up development banks? 
Fry observes “ Invariably, these specialized financial institutions have been established to attract 
foreign resources, to mobilize domestic savings (in part by developing capital markets), and to 
allocate investable funds efficiently”. 
Kitchen (1986) takes a broader view: “The raison d’etre of a Development Finance 
Corporation in a market (or mixed) economy is to provide long-term finance (debt or equity) which 
the capital market cannot, or will not provide.” He adds that among the broader aims to which 
governments expect development banks to subscribe are: 
• The creation of employment 
• The saving or earning of foreign exchange 
• The distribution of income (between social classes, ethnic groups etc) 
• The diversification of industry 
• The modernization of the agricultural sector 
• The development of small business 
• The encouragement of entrepreneurial activity 
• The development of the capital market 
Have development banks been a success? 
To answer the above question, we need to evaluate how important and how effective a role 
development banks have played in financial sector development in emerging market economies? 
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Set out hereunder are the views of a number of economists, some with practical experience in 
the field: 
Maxwell Fry (1995, pg 364) 
“The record of the past 30 years suggests that DFIs have attracted foreign resources effectively, 
have failed completely to mobilize domestic resources, and have a mixed (and deteriorating) record 
in allocating funds to productive investment projects. In general, DFI efforts at promoting capital 
markets have been disappointing.” 
He adds “Very few DFIs have become self – supporting autonomous financial institutions 
capable of mobilizing resources entirely on commercial terms. This is partly because DFIs have 
often been required to make loans at low rates of interest, frequently negative in real terms.” 
The development bank in practice 
An economist with considerable experience working in the development banking field opines that, 
although usually lending to projects that commercial lenders consider to be too risky, in practice, 
the development bank rarely addresses the twin problems of lending risk and access to finance. 
Hence, most development banks around the world are bankrupt, either because of the inherent risk 
of the projects to which they lend, or because political interference pushes development banks to 
lend to well connected borrowers who frequently feel no obligation to repay their loans. At the 
other extreme, the few development banks that are solvent lend only to the highest quality 
borrowers at subsidized interest rates, thus crowding out commercial lenders. In this economist’s 
experience hardly any development banks have been worthwhile and, in particular, have not made 
any meaningful contribution to financial market development. He identifies the usual problems 
from which such institutions suffer as including: 
• Political interference, which results in loans being made to government supporters. 
• Below market interest rates, which crowd out private sector lenders 
• High default rates 
• Poor collection records 
• Government bail- outs on a regular basis. 
However, he notes that Singapore is a special case, “There are 99 bad examples against this 
one good one, which exists in a country which “works” with an efficient bureaucracy, non-existent 
crime, an immigration service that is a model for the world, a telecoms sector that is very low cost, 
utilities that are efficient, and the best private airline in the world. 
Kitchen (1986) 
Kitchen argues that “any government which aims to develop an expanding and competitive 
financial sector should appreciate also that the favoured position of the DFC is, in the long run, 
incompatible with that aim. Moreover, a protected DFC may even discourage the development of 
private sector financial institutions, because the latter will clearly be unable to compete with it, and 
the development of long - term lending by the private sector may be discouraged.” Kitchen’s 
comment is in line with the point just made above about solvent development banks crowding out 
commercial lenders. 
14 
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Other caribbean and latin american experience 
The following comments from an economist who has worked on development bank reform in the 
Caribbean and Latin America explains the challenges currently faced by development banks very 
well. Apparently, his views reflect the current views on the subject of the major multi-laterals: 
”I have worked on development bank reform in Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago (T&T), as 
well as several Latin American countries. In all cases the only thing that has any chance of 
working is when the state owned development bank limits its operations to second tier 
(wholesale) lending, and channels the funds through the commercial first tier banking system. 
Interest rates need to be market determined with the wholesale development bank lending at rates 
roughly at or above the deposit mobilization (savings) rate paid by commercial banks. This assures 
that the retail banks, S&Ls, microfinance instititutions, etc. do not have the perverse incentive of 
borrowing from the development bank instead of mobilizing funds from their own depositors. 
Secondly the first tier institutions should be able freely to set their on-lending (retail) interest rates 
based on market considerations. (i.e. they should not be required to lend at predetermined, 
"preferential" below market rates). 
In Barbados we made a policy based loan which resulted in the conversion of the Barbados 
National Bank from a de facto, highly insolvent development bank (which had been making 
uncollectable loans to unprofitable sugar growers and mills), into a privatized commercial bank. 
This is one of the few happy endings of a development bank story that I know of, and of course it 
ended well because the BNB got out of the development banking business. The loan also called for 
the closure of the Barbados Development Bank, which had required repeated recapitalizations from 
the Government. There was also an understanding that any successor "development bank or banks" 
in Barbados would be majority privately owned. The BDB was closed but unfortunately the goal of 
a viable niche development bank has not been achieved. Two successor institutions have been 
created and although their shares were offered for sale, there was insufficient private sector interest 
and the institutions are now floundering along, losing money, as government-owned first-tier 
development banks. One of these institutions has an equity window, with the problem that it is 
very difficult for a state-owned institution to be impartial and free from (albeit subtle) influence in 
its decisions as to where to make equity investments. Their main saving grace is that they are 
sufficiently small that they are not doing much damage. 
In T&T we tried to reform the Agricultural Development Bank, but we were unsuccessful. 
There is essentially no justification for the ADB as T&T is a small homogeneous country with the 
commercial banks having more branches in the rural areas than the ADB. However, the ADB is a 
highly political institution serving some important constituencies. It loses money, but I guess the 
party in power feels that is a small price to pay. Fortunately it is essentially irrelevant and therefore 
is not distorting the financial markets of T&T. 
Our experience in Peru was better, with COFIDE, the state owned development bank getting 
out of the retail lending business and channelling its funds at essentially market rates through the 
commercial banks and specialized private sector development lending institutions. We have also 
been pursuing more fundamental financial sector reforms in Peru, where the Congress recently 
approved one of the first secured transactions laws in Latin America.” 
Colin Mayer 
Mayer points out that, over the years, World Bank missions have recommended the establishment 
of development finance companies (DFCs) to provide long term financing for worthwhile 
(primarily industrial) projects. His review of DFC performance suggests that, in general, it has been 
disappointing. Few are self supporting; a third are in serious difficulties, and as far back as 1983 
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half of the banks had arrears on a quarter of their loans. In consequence, even by the early 1980s, 
the Bank's wisdom in establishing DFCs was being questioned. Moreover, from his recent 
experience in a group of developing countries, Mr. Mayer concludes that :  
• an efficient banking system is central to the promotion of economic growth,  
• the performance of financial markets is not necessarily furthered by artificially 
lengthening the maturity of bank lending,  
• economic growth is not promoted through the financing of projects,  
• corporate organization, not project activity, is what distinguishes developed from 
developing countries- in other words, economic growth relies on the structure and quality 
of financial institutions., and  
• financial assistance is only part of what is needed to create an appropriate institutional 
structure -monitoring and rewarding individuals may often be more pertinent. 
Is the concept of the development bank fatally flawed? 
Kitchen (1986) argued that DFIs frequently found themselves obliged to finance projects where: 
• The financial structure would not meet normal commercial criteria. Generally this means 
the debt/equity ratio is too high, because of the inability of the sponsors to raise sufficient 
equity. The DFI may then supplement the equity by taking some itself; this, though, 
increases its total exposure, perhaps to levels that would not normally be considered 
prudent. 
• The cash flow cannot meet the bank’s normal repayment terms. The DFI is then required 
to extend its grace periods or normal maturities. This it may be able to do, but for a DFI 
which operates on a revolving fund basis such slow repayment circumscribes its ability to 
finance future (and perhaps more deserving) projects 
• Little or no worthwhile security is available. This applies notably to small businesses, or 
businesses that already have a prior charge on their existing assets. In the event of failure 
of a business, the market for the assets may anyway be very limited, thus ensuring that 
little will be realized from their sale. The smaller and poorer a country is, the truer this is 
likely to be 
• The entrepreneur has little track record, either in the line of business being financed, or in 
any other business. These risks apply a fortiori if the industry in question, or the 
technology, is new to the country, which is often the case. 
Clearly, financing projects, subject to the deficiencies identified above by Kitchen, brings 
into sharp focus why DFIs often find themselves financing risky projects. Moreover, 
macroeconomic imbalances, in particular the debt burden, have resulted in governments, such as the 
Jamaican government, having to pay high interest rates on government debt. This has resulted in 
banks holding very high concentrations of government debt which, in Jamaica, constitute the 
equivalent of over 40 per cent of total deposit liabilities, one of the highest government debt/deposit 
ratios in the world. This results in  high levels of real interest rates, whilst substantial spreads 
between borrowing and lending rates exacerbates the problem.  
Basic capital market theory suggests higher risk sectors should have a higher discount rate. 
Thus, new projects ought to pay a significant risk premium over the rates paid by Government. 
However, the higher the rate of return demanded by the lender, the more likely it is that the 
company will fail. Hence, the riskier the project becomes. 
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The degree of risk assumed by DFCs is heightened when government objectives lead the 
DFC to concentrate its lending and investments in a few industries, thus depriving it of the 
possibility of holding a well – diversified portfolio of loans and equity stakes. Specialized 
institutions such as agricultural development banks have even less scope for risk diversification. 
Thus, the principle of diversification is a strong argument against establishing institutions that are 
too specialized. 
Despite this high degree of risk, to meet Government’s national objectives, development 
banks have often been required to finance projects, whose rate of return is expected to be relatively 
low i.e. below what would be acceptable on commercial grounds. In short, development banks have 
been obliged to take high financial and commercial risks, which would normally require high 
expected returns, but at very low rates of return.  Clearly, the twin problem of low rate of return is 
just as important as the risk factor.  
This low rate of return also adversely affects the ability of the development bank to access 
finance. Kitchen (Pg 125) believes “that mobilization of funds is, probably rightly, a minor role of 
DFCs. They can, of course, tap the capital market with bond or equity issues (their own or their 
clients’), but they are not equipped to mobilize small savings on a national scale. Such functions are 
best left to post offices or specialized savings and loan banks. ” However, if DFCs are to tap the 
capital market with bond or equity issues to enable them to increase steadily their lending and 
investment, they need to be profitable.  
One may conclude from the above that where a development bank is required to lend at 
relatively low, “below market” interest rates to acquire “riskier” loan portfolios than those of local 
commercial banks, this constitutes a fatal flaw in its modus operandi. Hence, its survival will 
depend on continued Government or institutional subventions.  
Conclusion of part 1 
Kitchen refers to the above flaw as the “Danger of Social Credit” arguing that to expect DFCs “to 
act as social institutions may be altogether too much.” He acknowledges that the problem would be 
alleviated if there were in existence a sufficient number of projects that were simultaneously both 
financially acceptable i.e bankable and socially acceptable i.e. developmental.  However, he points 
out that the number of projects with both high financial and social returns is likely to be limited. He 
therefore concludes that “There is a danger ... that DFCs may become financiers of last resort 
instead, lending on projects which are not acceptable to private sector financial institutions.”      
The above conclusions call into question the continued relevance of development banks 
today. It is undeniable that long term finance is necessary for industry, agriculture, certain services, 
and infrastructure, and where this is not financed directly by government, it is not satisfactory that it 
be provided through rolling over short term loans whose continued availability is uncertain. Whilst 
DFI’s have provided long term finance, the question is whether this could have been better provided 
through better avenues. 
The foregoing  leads to the following further questions: 
• Were the DFCs established in the right way so that the solutions match the problem: 
• Whether new roles, strategies and instruments are now appropriate to justify their 
continued existence. 
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It is submitted that, in attempting to answer these questions, the Jamaican experience should 
be particularly helpful. However, it should be borne in mind the social credit issue may be less 
relevant to Jamaica than to many other developing countries because the Development Bank of 
Jamaica has, for the most part, stopped the practice of making loans directly, and has mainly lent 
through the major commercial banks and other institutional lenders. 
 
18 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 193 A new approach to development banking in Jamaica 
2. The Jamaican experience of 
development banking 
History of development banking in Jamaica 
The History of Development Banking in Jamaica reflects the underlying 
theme of Part I of this document. This is highlighted by the following 
analysis of the various development and quasi-development banks 
established in Jamaica since independence in 1962: 
The Jamaica development bank 
The Jamaica Development Bank (JDB) was established in 1969 to 
“provide the type of assistance required to facilitate the establishment and 
operation of “development enterprises” identified in the Jamaica 
Development Bank Act, 1969 specifically as “industrial, tourist, housing, 
and commercial agricultural enterprises.” In addition, a subsidiary, the 
Small Industry Development Finance Company (SIFCO), was set up 
specifically for the purpose of targeting small enterprise.  
It was envisaged the services which JDB would provide would 
include “direct loans, loans with equity participation, the underwriting 
of securities, guarantees, and the provision of financial advice to 
potential as well as existing clients” (Central Planning Unit, 
1969:113). From the start, the commitment to support the development 
of the financial sector was explicit. For example, the Act specifically 
charged  the JDB  with responsibility to “assist persons in establishing, 
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carrying on, or expanding development enterprises by participating in share capital, granting loans, 
and providing other forms of financial assistance,” and crucially to “foster the development of 
money and capital markets” (Jamaica Development Bank Act, 1969: s 4.1; Central Planning Unit, 
1970:103). In short, the task of the JDB was not only to provide the entrepreneur with finance but 
also to follow the German model identified by Gerschenkron by offsetting the shortcomings of 
individual entrepreneurs by sharing the entrepreneurial function. Thus, the JDB was expected to 
“furnish financial advice and provide or assist in obtaining managerial, technical, and 
administrative services for development enterprises in Jamaica.” However, it should be noted 
that notwithstanding the presence of discretionary powers relating to these extension activities, 
these activities were not viewed as a mandate and were not given priority focus in the general 
scheme. This was at least partly because of the JDB’s limited capacity to perform these functions. 
During the controversial 1970s period, both JDB and SIFCO became virtually insolvent. This 
was due to the fact that it had made large loans to a bankrupt Government, as well as well as 
suffering from a high number of non- performing direct loans. In consequence, the JDB lost the 
ability to raise finance on the international markets or from any other source. 
National development bank (NDB) 
The JDB was replaced by The National Development Bank of Jamaica Limited (“NDB”), 
established in 1981 following the change in government in 1980. Its primary function was to foster 
the country’s economic development, and to increase the availability and access to medium and 
long term project – based financing. However, in the light of the JDB’s experience, with the goal of 
minimising credit risk, the lending mandate changed, so that all loans by the NDB were now made 
to borrowers through commercial banks, merchant banks and other financial institutions, recognized 
as Approved Financial Institutions (“AFIs”) by the NDB. This of course is the second tier 
approach identified in Part I as being the only way to enable development banks to remain 
solvent. 
The idea was that commercial banks and other AFIs could reduce their interest rate spread, 
enabling them to lend to their customers with small increases in the interest rate charged to the 
borrower.Funding for the NDB was provided by lines of credit from the World Bank (secured 
through the Government), The Caribbean Development Bank(“CDB”) (Government guaranteed) 
and The European Investment Bank (“EIB”) as well as the Government of Jamaica. 
National import – export bank of Jamaica 
The National Export – Import Bank of Jamaica was established in 1986 as a limited liability 
company jointly owned by the Bank of Jamaica and the Government of Jamaica to take over and 
execute the functions of the former Jamaica Export Credit Insurance Corporation. The Ex-Im 
Bank’s main objective is to provide financial support and export credit insurance to the productive 
sector, so as to facilitate the expansion of local industry and trade between Jamaica and foreign 
countries. Foreign currency funding is also provided to facilitate the importation of capital 
equipment and raw materials needed by public sector entities, engaged in infrastructural 
development projects, which have national impact and enhance the productive sector of the country.  
The agricultural credit bank (ACB) 
The Agricultural Credit Bank (“ACB”) was also established in June 1981 to facilitate agricultural 
and agro – industrial development in Jamaica through the provision of loan financing. Financing 
was provided to all eligible agricultural and agro-industrial enterprises. Funding to the ACB was 
provided by multilateral and bilateral agencies, the Government and internally generated sources. 
20 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 193 A new approach to development banking in Jamaica 
The AC Bank took over lending to agriculture from the pre-existing Agricultural Credit 
Board and was expected to “be run as a viable enterprise … to provide credit to farmers on a timely, 
cost-effective and relevant basis.” The AC Bank was designed to “operate as a wholesaler of credit” 
and to “on-lend funds to commercial banks and approved institutions such as the People’s 
Cooperative Banks and Cooperatives” that in turn operated to provide “retail credit to farmers and 
… bear the risk of the loans”-again a second tier approach. 
National investment bank of Jamaica (NIBJ) 
The National Investment Bank of Jamaica (“NIBJ”) succeeded the Jamaica National Investment 
Company Limited by an act of Parliament in 1984. According to its website, NIBJ aims to play a 
pro-active role as an investor in the local capital market, to act as a catalyst for investors with new 
ideas and to assist in the expansion of medium to large-scale businesses.  
Through equity and quasi-equity financing, NIBJ invests in development projects that are 
designed to improve and broaden the country’s economic base. The Bank makes investments, 
primarily to finance capital expenditure, in the seven key economic sectors of agriculture, 
manufacturing, mining & minerals, entertainment, infrastructure, information technology, and 
tourism, which are supported by the National Industrial Policy (NIP).  
In recent years, the NIBJ’s mandate has been to act as the Government’s central privatization 
agency focusing on the divestment of public sector assets, responsible for, amongst many other 
privatizations, the divestment of Air Jamaica. The divestments were supposed to serve as catalysts 
for attracting incremental capital flows whilst simultaneously relieving the Government of any 
financial responsibility for the operations of these entities. 
Merger of DBJ/NIBJ 
The Agricultural Credit Bank of Jamaica Limited (ACB) and the National Development Bank of 
Jamaica (NDB) were merged on April 1st, 2000 creating the Development Bank of Jamaica 
(DBJ).This was followed some years later by the merger of DBJ and NIBJ. 
Minister of Finance, Omar Davis, in his 2004/2005 budget speech addressed the proposed 
merger of the Development Bank of Jamaica, and the National Investment Bank of Jamaica. His 
comments explain the issues involved well, and are quoted verbatim: 
“The fact is that the previous merger - of the former ACB and NDB - was quickly effected 
because the institutions were very similar except for areas of focus. In this case, there is a difference 
in that NIBJ has significant equity stakes in a range of companies, unlike the DBJ which is 
essentially a bank with a loan portfolio. As such the analysis has demonstrated that, prior to 
effecting the merger, it is important that the various investments held by NIBJ be reviewed, so as 
not to affect the balance sheet of the DBJ which, as is generally accepted, is in excellent financial 
state. Put another way, there is need for us to separate those investments which have not been 
profitable, prior to proceeding with the merger of the two institutions. The timetable is that this will 
be done during this fiscal year.However, even when the merger takes place, gains will be in terms 
of increased efficiency levels and greater focus in terms of developmental initiatives”. Hence, “there 
are no significant” budgetary “savings to be reaped from this merger.” 
From the Minister’s explanation, it is clear that the motive was not cost saving but the rather 
more intangible motives of “increased efficiency” and “greater focus in terms of developmental 
initiatives.” However, there appears to be lack of transparency to the merger process as the DBJ, a 
second tier institution, was owed some J$1.7 billion by the NIBJ Conversely, the NIBJ had been 
functioning as a first tier institution, investing in equity and direct loans, including functioning as an 
AFI for the DBJ.  This leaves one to wonder as whether the real motive for the merger was to 
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channel more of DBJ’s funds into NIBJ. In other words, was the NIBJ running out of funds because 
of non-performing loans or inadequate returns on its equity investments, whilst the DBJ remained 
fairly liquid due to operating on a second tier basis. If indeed this were the case, one might well 
speculate as to whether the root cause of NIBJ’s problem was its failure participate directly in the 
management of the entrepreneurial activities in which it invested in accordance with the German 
model identified by Gerschenkron.   
The development bank of Jamaica interview  
The Development Bank of Jamaica (DBJ) does very little direct “retail” lending to the ultimate 
customer, preferring to make most of its loans to Approved Financial Institutions (AFIs) at a 
standard interest rate, with a fixed spread at which the institution can on – lend the money. This 
lending preference is reflected in its loan portfolio, which is currently almost entirely made up of 
“wholesale” loans to financial and agricultural institutions, Government of Jamaica support 
programmes, and Government of Jamaica infrastructural loan programmes. 
According to management, the DBJ adopts a fairly “hands off’ approach to the approval of 
credit as their credit risk limited to that of the intermediary institution e.g. frequently a well 
capitalized commercial bank, rather than the underlying customer loan. Jamaica’s AFIs include its 
six commercial banks, nine merchant banks and several “other” AFI s including the Jamaica 
Cooperative Credit Union League, the Jamaica Agricultural Development Foundation, National 
Development Foundation of Jamaica and the National People’s Cooperative Bank’s Offices, or so 
called PC Banks. 
The DBJ’s small and medium size enterprise lending is mainly to the agricultural sector, 
particularly small farmers, virtually all through the PC bank network (now that the Agricultural 
Credit Bank no longer exists). This has recently been consolidated into a National PC Bank of 
Jamaica with 30 individual branches. Often over a hundred years old, typically PC banks were set 
up by the pastor, teacher or other rural community leader in their local community. According to 
DBJ management, commercial banks regard farming and agriculture as high risk, and many of the 
PC bank loans would not be regarded as “bankable” by the mainstream commercial banks.  
The PC banks, even after their recent consolidation, are thinly capitalised so with the PC 
banks, unlike the other AFI’s, the DBJ takes what it calls a “hands on” approach in looking to the 
underlying loan “as if we are making that loan” for repayment. Moreover, the DBJ is required 
generally to take a more proactive role with the PC banks as they are typically relatively 
unsophisticated, but providing technical assistance for the development of the agricultural industry. 
Whilst most of their loans are to individual farmers, they are currently lending to a cooperative as a 
pilot project in St. Thomas, as part of a program to encourage greater farming linkages to tourism. 
In April 2004, the bank also earmarked a $10 million dollar revolving fund for disbursement 
through the Jamaica Business Development Centre (JBDC), and has also earmarked money 
specifically for micro lending through Jamaica National Building Society. 
An example of industry re-engineering - poultry farming 
According to DBJ management, significant loans have been made to the broiler industry, 
particularly for investments in “tunnel ventilation”. Whilst the smallest PC banks loans can be as 
low as JA $200,000, agricultural loans for tunnel ventilation can go as high as $30 million or more. 
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According to the DBJ management, the re-engineering of the sector is being driven by the 
Jamaica Broilers group, who provide management and economies of scale and an assured market 
for the final product of chicken. Marketing is typically one of a small farmers biggest problems, 
although perhaps an even bigger problem for their farming clients was that the large hotels do not 
pay on time, creating such a squeeze on their small suppliers as to be almost criminal. 
The size of the DBJ’s lending 
The DBJ approved 129 local currency loans totaling $1.24 billion during the year ended March 31st, 
2005 (of which 94 or $103 million of the total loans came from PC banks). Consequently, 
agriculture and agro industry together comprised 88% of total loans, although only a combined 43% 
of loans by value. There is a “guideline” of $100 million for an individual tourist loan, but this is 
not a hard and fast limit. No foreign currency loans were approved. This compares with the 128 
local currency loans that were approved in March 2004 totaling $1.35 billion, with U.S. $27.7 
million in foreign loans approved.(Appendix 8 – Analysis of Development Bank of Jamaica 
Lending gives a comprehensive breakdown of the DBJ’s loans, sources of funds etc.) 
The DBJ’s lending rates and terms 
The standard lending rate for Jamaican dollar loans is 10% plus a maximum banking spread of 3%, 
or a combined 13%, whilst the U.S. dollar lending rate is 7% plus 2%. The length of the loans can 
be up to 10 to 12 years, and the bank is willing to look at restructuring. The Bank of Nova Scotia 
Jamaica recently provided a one-off special line of $350 million and $250 million at lending rates of 
8% and 7.875%, but allowed DBJ a spread of only 0% and 1/8% spread respectively. 
The impact of the NIBJ merger and the trafalgar development bank 
takeover  
DBJ management agreed that the takeover of Trafalgar Development Bank had created a vacuum in 
the system for equity and venture capital. They were also concerned that, whilst the NIBJ’s role in 
equity financing will continue as part of the new DBJ, due to the NIBJ’s relative lack of success in 
this area, there was a critical question of how equity investments should be made going forward. 
However, in their view, the merger of the NIBJ and DBJ would improve the DBJ’s 
knowledge of the borrower, as formerly a project frequently went to NIBJ for equity finance, and 
then went to an AFI for a loan, delaying the process and creating bureaucratic complexity. The 
merger meant that the relevant information would now all be under one roof. The merged institution 
would also continue its lead role in privatizations of state owned enterprises. 
Problems experienced by development banks with equity 
financing 
DBJ management appeared to believe there was a cultural problem of honouring commitments in 
Jamaica, stating as evidence that even some very large private companies refused to give audited 
financial statements. They agreed however that a credit bureau would improve compliance. 
Whilst they also agreed the ideal was improved access to equity, in practice they were very 
cautious on equity financing as in their view many entrepreneurs needed the big stick provided by 
the receivership option in loan financing to encourage repayment. However, their own history of 
getting money back from putting companies into receivership was very poor, as receiverships in 
their view seemed mostly to benefit the receivers. 
DBJ management suggested that the rules for successful equity investing for development 
banks should include the need for real board meetings, and the necessity for good information so 
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the bank knows what was going on in the company. All this boiled down to the need for a true 
culture of partnership between the bank and the entrepreneur. The problem in Jamaica was that 
most Jamaican entrepreneurs regarded equity as merely a loan, and therefore did not believe any 
financial reporting was required. As an investment instrument, preference shares required dividends 
to make a return but typically entrepreneurs reported that no profit had been made out of which to 
pay those dividends. Moreover, entrepreneurs knew that, as a development bank, the DBJ would be 
reluctant to take a decision to foreclose. 
Why there is still a need for a DBJ?  
Unlike the commercial banks who are mainly financing consumer credit, the DBJ’s management 
believes that Jamaica’s development banks lend for development of industry. Another problem with 
the commercial banks is that they resist accessing DBJ funds due to the lower spread of DBJ 
lending. Commercial banks are not bullish about agriculture as they perceive it to be high risk. As a 
consequence, to get development going, the DBJ believes it is also forced to do non-core activities 
like adopting a school to assist it in moving agricultural projects towards best practices. The 
justification for this approach is that students need to see opportunity in agriculture, where the DBJ 
management believes there are very significant opportunities in resuscitating ginger, cocoa and 
financing sea island cotton on ex sugar land. They agreed however that the DBJ’s performance in 
developing manufacturing industry in Jamaica had been disappointing. They attributed this to high 
security costs and energy costs, which made it very difficult for Jamaica to compete in this area. 
Reflections on Trafalgar development bank  
Trafalgar Development Bank (“TDB”) was established in May 1984 to provide development funds 
(through loans, leases and equity investments) to enterprises in manufacturing, tourism, agriculture 
and horticulture, mining and the services sectors. Funding was primarily provided by USAID, EIB, 
CDB etc. TDB was founded by a group of Jamaican business leaders, who headed up some of 
Jamaica’s largest companies, such as Grace Kennedy, Geddes Grant, The Gleaner Company, Pan 
Jamaican Investment Trust etc. It was born out of the conviction that the Private Sector should be 
the engine of growth for the economy, not the government. Prior to the establishment of TDB, all 
development banking in Jamaica had been undertaken by the government, with the assistance of 
institutions such as USAID. In the past, it had been the policy of USAID, only to grant loans to 
Jamaican government institutions. Indeed, in the late Seventies, Jamaican businessmen had found it 
ironical that USAID would only lend to the Jamaican government, when that government was 
perceived as being bent on destroying the private sector. However, in the Eighties, with the changes 
in the administration in both the USA and Jamaica, USAID changed its policy and began to actively 
(and directly) support the private sector. 
The start up phase 
As a consequence of this change in policy, USAID took on the role of sponsor of the TDB project, 
providing TDB with both technical and financial assistance. The German Development Bank 
(DEG) and the Dutch Development Bank (FMO) also provided TDB with technical and financial 
assistance, in addition to taking up significant stakes in TDB’s equity. This equity participation 
entitled these institutions to board representation. On the other hand, although USAID did not 
participate in the equity of TDB, it did provide TDB with a significant amount of long-term loans to 
fund TDB’s development banking activities. Initially, the quantum of these funds was determined 
on the basis that USAID would match, dollar for dollar, whatever funds TDB was able to raise 
itself. In recognition of the role played by USAID in the establishment of USAID, whilst USAID 
did not have formal board representation, it was nonetheless be entitled to have its representatives 
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attend TDB board meetings. The government also made its contribution to the successful launch of 
TDB by entering into an arrangement with TDB whereby, when the time came to repay the USAID 
loans, US dollars would be sold to TDB at the same rate as that prevailing at the time the US dollars 
were initially borrowed (J$5:US$1).n addition, TDB was granted tax free status by being classified 
as a venture capital corporation.   
Practical problems 
As indicated above, TDB seemed to have everything – the finance on a “sweetheart deal” basis, the 
technical assistance, tax free status and strong local and foreign partners - everything that seemed to 
be needed to operate a highly successful development bank. Thus, TDB could be expected to 
succeed where the Jamaican government’s development banks had failed. However, from its 
inception, it began to encounter similar difficulties to those experienced by the Government entities. 
Specifically, those seeking to borrow from TDB tended to look upon TDB: 
• simply as a source of cheaper funds than those obtainable from the commercial banks 
• a source of funds to finance projects which the commercial banks considered too risky to 
finance. 
Such projects were often the brainchild of the entrepreneur, who wanted to keep for himself all 
the potential gains of the project. On the other hand, he was either unwilling or unable to put up the 
capital needed to seed the project. Indeed, he wished TDB to substitute long-term development loans for 
his equity. In short, the entrepreneur’s goal was to get TDB to take all the risk which should have been 
borne by the company’s equity, without TDB having any of that equity. Thus, TDB’s its potential return 
would be limited to a low rate of interest on its development loans. Another motive for the entrepreneur 
wanting to retain 100% control of the project was his desire to keep his affairs away from the prying 
eyes of the income tax department and the exchange control authorities.  
Another problem with which TDB was faced was the fact that, in addition to almost non 
existent accounting records, the entrepreneur did not have the ability to put the details of his project 
together in a format, which could be presented to the TDB Finance and Credit Committee (F&C) as 
a “bankable proposition”. Moreover, he was usually either unable or unwilling to put up the finance 
required to hire a professional to undertake the task. 
TDB’s project analysis team 
TDB had established a project analysis team, whose task was to assess the feasibility of  projects 
submitted to TDB and to make recommendations as to whether such projects were  “bankable”. 
Such assessments were to take into account not only feasibility but also whether the capital 
structure proposed to seed a project would provide TDB with a cushion adequate to protect the loan 
finance it was being asked to provide. In the event of the cushion being inadequate, the team would 
be expected to recommend what additional security should be obtained from the entrepreneur. 
However, the project analysis team found itself in the position that it not only had to vet the 
entrepreneur’s feasibility study but also had to prepare the actual study. The net effect of this was 
that, in their anxiety to put development project loans on the books of TDB, the project analysis 
team was tempted to prepare feasibility studies which it felt it could “sell” to the F&C. Thus, the 
latter committee was likely to have feasibility studies placed before it, which looked at development 
projects through “rose coloured spectacles”. Indeed, the cash flow statements submitted to the F&C 
sometimes indicated such a tremendous positive project cash flow that it begged the question “with 
this level of cash flow, why does the entrepreneur need to borrow from TDB at all?” 
Another issue was that of capital structure. Knowing that the F&C would be concerned at 
TDB taking virtually all the risk without any equity participation the project analysis team would 
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often arrange for a part of the development loan to be in the form of preference shares. This was 
portrayed to the F&C as “equity participation”. However, these preference shares were not 
convertible preference shares and, hence, could be considered the “worst of all worlds” in that they 
did not have the rights afforded to a creditor in the event of a liquidation, nor did they have the 
benefit of participating in the profits (other than a small preference dividend) were the company to 
be successful. The project analysis team defended these arrangements on the basis that this was as 
far as entrepreneurs were prepared to go in relation to equity participation. 
Another assurance sometimes given to the F&C was that the TDB management had negotiated a 
seat on the board of the entrepreneur company. However, these seats were taken up by members of 
TDB’s management team not by independent members of the F&C. In fact, very few reports on the 
progress of these projects ever filtered back to the F&C as a result of such board representation.  
From the above, one might draw the conclusion that the TDB management and the project 
analysis team were on the side of the entrepreneur rather than TDB. In other words they seemed to 
view their role as being that of getting the best possible deal for the entrepreneur, rather than getting 
the best possible deal for TDB. In such a scenario it was inevitable that many of the projects 
financed by TDB would either fail or become delinquent, requiring debt repayments to be 
rescheduled and, in some cases, requiring fresh loans to ensure the entrepreneur stayed in business – 
sometimes throwing good money after bad. Certainly, very few projects lived up to the glowing 
feasibility studies submitted to the F&C.  
The phasing out of TDB’s development banking operations 
In these circumstances, TDB’s profit performance came under pressure although, with the 
continued sharp devaluation of the Jamaican dollar over the period of TDB’s existence, the 
sweetheart deal with the Jamaican Government in respect of the repayment of the initial USAID 
loan to some extent cushioned TDB against the adverse effects of these losses. Cash flow also came 
under pressure although, for a time, TDB was reasonably successful in raising new soft long term 
loans from international institutions. Eventually, sources of long terms loans started to dry up 
whilst, at the same time, and both DEG and FMO appeared to be losing interest in TDB. 
Accordingly the future prospects of TDB were discussed at board level. When the FMO director 
was asked what is the future of development banking his answer was succinct: “Development 
Banking is dead!”. Eventually DEG and FMO sold their stakes in TDB paving the way for Pan 
Jamaican Investment Trust Limited to acquire a controlling interest in TDB.  TDB’s development 
banking operations were then phased out and its project analysis team and most of its management 
and staff were made redundant. TDB then became a financial services company, which has now 
been rebranded as Pan Caribbean Financial Services. 
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Conclusion 
The fact that TDB did not make it in the development banking field when it was set up with 
everything in its favour: 
• Soft loans 
• Exchange rate protection 
• Technical & financial support from international institutions 
• Strong partners both local and institutional  
• Tax free status as a venture capital corporation 
Suggests that the traditional development banking approach does not work. Thus, TDB failed 
because it operated in the same manner as governmental development banks had done in the past 
rather than as a venture capital corporation as its tax free status implied. 
Venture Capital / Private Equity Organisations normally operate on the principle that they 
only expect to back 2 winners out of any 10 projects they finance. However, they do expect to make 
enough gains out of these two winners to cover, not only the losses they have sustained on the other 
eight projects, but also to produce a handsome return for their shareholders. Clearly, TDB (along 
with development banks in general) did not operate on this principle having neither real equity 
participation in the projects financed, nor any control over the actions of the entrepreneurs whose 
projects it was financing. In summary, one must conclude that development banking can only be 
successful if it is operated along the same lines as venture capital / private equity organizations. 
The financing of small and medium sized businesses in Jamaica 
A brief review of their loan and investment portfolios over the past five years, including the number 
and size of loans and investments made, suggests that the focus of the Development Bank of 
Jamaica and the National Investment Bank of Jamaica has not been on financing small and medium 
sized enterprises (SME’s) in Jamaica, and certainly not micro – enterprise lending. Possibly in 
response to this, a number of programmes targeting SMEs are planned. In addition to a plan to lend 
to the SMEs through the Development Bank of Jamaica, a number of other schemes are being set in 
motion.   The details of these schemes are covered in the following numbered appendices: 
• The Private Sector Development Programme (PSDP) – Appendix 1 
• The Mutual Guarantee Company (MGC) Concept – Appendix 2 
• The Credit Unions - Appendix 3 
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3. Financial deepening in Jamaica 
Capital market access 
For most of their existence, Jamaica’s development banks, like their 
developing country counterparts abroad, have been provided with long 
term finance mainly from Government budgets, aid from foreign 
Governments and loans from the major multi-laterals. By way of contrast, 
the multilateral development banks and the development banks of the 
major OECD countries appear to be successfully meeting almost all of 
their borrowing needs from the international capital markets. Their ability 
to tap international capital markets for financing seems to be linked to 
their high credit ratings, normally AAA, reflecting the fact that most 
nationally owned development banks’ ratings are typically rated the same 
as their countries’ ratings.  
Jamaica’s international rating of single B is a barrier to tapping 
international financing at rates attractive enough to on lend at their target 
U.S. dollar lending rate. Nevertheless, international capital market rates on 
Jamaica’s 2017 Eurobonds of just under 8% are only a little bit above the 6-
7% at which the DBJ borrows from international and regional development 
banks, and this includes their spread for administration costs etc. There 
would therefore appear to be a case for seeking to determine whether 
Jamaican development banks can access the capital markets, either through 
using an international rating agency such as an S&P to access international 
U.S. dollar financing, or a regional rating agency such as CariCRIS to 
access the regional capital market. Even absent the goal of raising money by 
way of a bond issue, a regional rating of the Jamaican development banks 
would be a good ‘private diagnostic” of their operations. 
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The need for transparency arising from seeking a regional rating may lead to an earlier 
recognition of losses, on the principle that “first loss is best loss”, as opposed to waiting for things 
to get worse as typically occurs worldwide in these scenarios. In the case of the newly merged DBJ 
and NIBJ for example, it is likely that the NIBJ portfolio in particular has a number of poorly 
performing equity or quasi equity (as non quoted equity investments, these are automatically 
difficult to value) investments that should be hived off from the core operations and restructured by 
some kind of “work out’ specialist. In the case of the newly merged DBJ and NIBJ for example, it is 
likely that the NIBJ portfolio in particular has a number of poorly performing equity or quasi equity 
(as non quoted equity investments, these are automatically difficult to value) investments that 
should be hived off from the core operations and restructured by some kind of “work out’ specialist. 
In any case, there is an argument for splitting that portfolio into two pools, one for investments that 
are at market or near market prices and one that is marked down to reflect the element of subsidy 
granted at inception, either as a lower interest rate or reflecting the under-pricing of the risk.  
According to their March 31st 2005 financial statements, the DBJ’s portfolio is almost all 
“wholesale” financial and agricultural institution loans, Government of Jamaica support programme 
loans (almost all to state owned agriculture, largely sugar), and Government of Jamaica 
infrastructural loan programmes (roads and highways). These should not present any valuation 
problems for their accountants, Price WaterhouseCoopers. 
The product range of the development bank 
The range of financial products offered by development banks largely depends on their expertise, 
size and risk appetite. All three factors are in relatively short supply in Jamaica, implying a need for 
a new approach, preferably involving foreign expertise and capital, perhaps as part of a regional 
pooled arrangement. Concentrating the available local expertise and Government capital into a “one 
stop shop” for investments in Jamaica, using the DBJ as a catalyst, should allow Jamaica to expand 
its menu of financial products to better fit the needs of local entrepreneurs. Critical to the long-term 
success of any new approach will be the establishment of close links with the local private sector, 
preferably by means of a formalized public/ private sector partnership.  
However, conditions precedent to the achievement of these goals are that the cost of credit be 
reduced by making it easier to transfer financial ownership to creditors, and that there be an 
improvement in the access to information with the use of a credit bureau. Finally, there needs to be 
further development of local and regional securities markets. 
The first of these conditions was studied in detail by the IDB in their “IDB Private Sector 
Assessment of Jamaica”. This study is reproduced herein as Appendix 5. 
The second of these conditions is covered in Appendix 6 by 
• an abridged version of a newspaper article on a seminar/interview with Mr. Venkat 
Raman, the CEO and Chief Rating Officer of CariCRIS and 
• an appreciation of the benefits of credit bureaus, particularly for small business. This is 
entitled “ A credit bureau would increase access to credit.” 
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The standard loan product 
The standard loan product of the development bank is a long term loan which, because it increases 
the bank’s liquidity and interest rate risk, requires long–term financing e.g. long term loans, equity, 
donor grants etc for the DB to avoid excessive mismatching. The Development Bank of Jamaica’s 
standard lending rate for Jamaican dollar loans as a “wholesaler” is 10%, plus a maximum banking 
spread of 3% for its first tier “retail” lenders, or a combined 13%. The U.S. dollar lending rate is 7% 
plus a 2% spread. Although the length of the loans, at up to 10 to 12 years, is relatively long term, 
the DBJ management indicates it is willing to look at restructuring. This would extend the term of a 
loan still further. 
In years gone by, when the risk free rate on short-term Government paper was at high 
multiples of these lending rates. The Jamaican dollar lending rate in particular represented a very 
significant subsidy. Even now, there is a significant opportunity cost between the rate at which the 
Government borrows, and the rate at which the DBJ lends to the commercial banks, although this 
“cost” has narrowed substantially from its previous highs. Whilst it would seem likely that this 
“second tier” lending has increased the maturity of loans to business by providing longer term loans 
to the banking system, it is not clear that this has increased the overall volume of bank lending. In 
any case, total development bank lending in Jamaica, as in most other Caribbean countries, is only a 
very small percentage of total bank lending. However, it should be borne in mind that, in many 
cases, in the absence of other mechanisms there may be good reason for shorter term lending, as a 
form of control over the borrower. Furthermore, it is likely that most Jamaican companies 
borrowing from Jamaican development banks simply do so as a cheaper source of funding than that 
obtainable from commercial banks or as a source of funds for projects, which the commercial banks 
considered too risky to finance. Thus, the subsidized lending model is a fundamental weakness of 
Jamaican development banking, which has lead to continuing losses for the development banks 
requiring their repeated recapitalization. In short, they have been beset by the same problems as 
were identified in Part 1 as besetting development banks in general. 
Whilst the change in policy making most lending wholesale through the commercial banks 
(who then bear the credit risk) has largely eliminated this type of loss, it has also meant that the 
development bank is not likely to be financing the risky projects required for future development. If 
anything, the restriction on the spread the commercial banks can charge makes it likely that the 
development bank is indirectly financing even lower risk projects than those the commercial banks 
are financing out of other funds. As a consequence, much of the development bank’s wholesale 
funds have generated very little “investment additionality” as the borrowers have often included 
some of Jamaica’s largest companies, which could procure financing without going through a 
development bank. Thus, some cash rich companies would appear to have been recipients of an 
interest rate subsidy from a cash strapped government! 
Experience from developed countries suggests a change in product mix to providing 
relatively small subsidies to a larger number of borrowers might work better than the current 
approach. Moreover, combining this with technical or grant assistance to either high growth 
companies with potential to access new markets, or small and medium sized companies unable to 
get access to bank loans, due to poor technical capacity e.g. no financials, would appear a better 
way forward. It is therefore suggested that Jamaican development banks avoid subsidized lending, 
and focus instead on market rate loans (perhaps coupled with grants for technical assistance) in 
order to encourage a competitive environment for private sector lending and generate marketable 
loans for future securitization. In conclusion, the core loan product of development banks should 
complement rather than compete with the private banking and financial markets by providing 
tenors, amounts, currencies or interest rate structures not currently available. Thus, it would be 
“additional” to Jamaica’s existing commercial lending, thereby creating “new” lending and 
investment. 
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New financial products 
Identified hereunder are a number of new (other?) financial products which, it is submitted, will not 
only make development banks more liquid and therefore more effective, but will also enhance the 
Financial Deepening of Jamaica’s capital market: 
• Syndicated Lending or Co – Financing  
Involving other lenders is a good method of increasing the impact of small development 
banks with limited capital bases and sources of new funding, as is the case in Jamaica. Co-
financing or syndication partners could include commercial banks, official co-financiers 
(such as government agencies and bilateral financial institutions providing grants, parallel 
loans and equity), export credit agencies and other international financial institutions such as 
the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (loan syndications currently 
account for nearly 13% of their commitments or more than US$1 billion dollars per year). 
The development bank would act as the sole lender of record, whereby commercial banks 
participate in the loan through separately funded participation agreements. Besides the role of 
lender of record, the development institution performs an “agent” role. This role includes 
activities such as billing and disbursements, collecting debt service payments, remittance of 
these payments to participants as well as supervision and monitoring. The participating banks 
have no direct contractual relationship to the borrower. The agency loan would be on terms 
and conditions that other financial institutions cannot match, usually in the form of a longer 
tenor rather than a lower rate. The commercial credit risk would be shared by the 
development bank and the participating banks. However, by using the development bank as 
lender of record, the participants may enjoy protection due to the agency’s tax status (no 
withholding tax) as well as its de-facto preferred creditor status. 
• Securitisation and Structured Finance 
Securitisation is potentially a key way to develop the domestic medium to long-term debt 
market though offering “credit – enhanced” securities to domestic investors, typically by 
issuing debt against income generating assets. For example, a large infrastructure project 
could be financed through the sale to private investors of the securities of a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV), backed by the assets of the project. 
• Mortgage Securitisation 
As one of Jamaica’s development banking institutions, the Jamaica Mortgage Bank (JMB) 
might benefit from considering mortgage securitisation. Its current model is the traditional 
model where one institution performs the major functions of loan origination, servicing, and 
funding and portfolio risk management. This would require it to look at the modern 
“unbundled” mortgage delivery system, where the key functions are handled by specialized 
entities. The key advantage of this “unbundled” model would be to access a wider range of 
investors, ranging from local mutual or pensions funds to overseas Jamaicans, comfortable 
with investing in an asset secured by land. There is in principle no reason for the JMB to keep 
the mortgage assets if they can be sold, perhaps as a securitized pool; allowing them to make 
new mortgages and thereby improving mortgage availability. 
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• Short Term Financing  
Short-term lending markets are required for successful long-term lending markets, just as the 
ability of a stock exchange to raise capital depends on the liquidity of its secondary markets. 
However, despite short term loans being more readily available from commercial banks, there 
is still a potential role for Jamaican development banks to get more involved in short term 
lending products by the provision of working capital by means such as trade finance, 
factoring, personal loans and treasury services - all with the goal of achieving quite dramatic 
“quick wins”. 
• Factoring  
A particularly promising short term financing approach for the DBJ to consider is electronic 
factoring. Many small businesses in Jamaica are challenged to access bank financing. Small 
firms need to finance their production cycle but, after goods are delivered, most buyers 
demand 30 to 90 days to pay. Sellers issue an invoice – recorded for the buyer as an account 
payable and for the seller as an account receivable – which is an illiquid asset for the seller 
until payment is received. Such receivables fall into two categories: 
− Government Receivables: Virtually every small businessperson can give numerous 
examples of Government paying very late for goods or services, with the consequence 
that he or she can be put out of business due to lack of cash. An institution such as the 
DBJ factoring these receivables may do as much for the financial health of small and 
medium sized businesses in Jamaica as any other conceivable single measure 
− Private Sector Receivables: The case of the local agricultural industry supplying the 
large hotel chains deserves specific mention as another good example of small 
businessmen (sometimes even large distributors) being put under financial pressure by 
the late payment for goods supplied. The ability to get timely cash to invest in the 
agricultural cycle may be the best “linkage” to facilitate agricultural development. 
Such financing vehicles would be extremely helpful to the SMEs due to the fact that the 
lending interest rates of commercial banks are still very high in Jamaica with rates charged to SMEs 
being as high 22%. This is a reflection of the very high spread (12%) between the deposit and 
lending rates in Jamaica. According to the report of the IMF’s last Financial Sector Assessment 
Programme, this was the highest spread of a comparable group of highly indebted countries, the 
majority being from the Caribbean region. 
• Exim Bank Lending  
The specific needs of exporting firms are being met satisfactorily through the Exim Bank, 
although its programme could be expanded. 
The DBJ as Jamaica’s corporate financier 
Creditor finance 
To illustrate a proposal that Jamaica’s main development bank assume the role of a corporate 
financier, the institution has been likened to a multi - storey building, each of whose floors 
represents a capital structure, which reflects a particular level of appetite for risk. The top floor, or 
the debt financing just considered, normally requires specific collateral, with a fixed charge against 
a specific company asset. This debt is at the top of the building and is senior to all other payments at 
the time of liquidation. Beneath the top floor could be a secured lender with a floating charge over 
the assets. Below this level would be the unsecured lenders, who rank behind secured lenders if the 
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company goes into liquidation. Often this is done by “negative pledge’, referring to financial ratios 
(gearing, interest cover) which the company agrees not to breach. 
Mezzanine or quasi equity financing  
Mezzanine financing, a hybrid or form of quasi equity, is a basic component of venture capital style 
financing, and includes subordinated loans (coming after secured debt in bankruptcy) such as 
convertible loans or loans with equity positions, participating loans/preference shares, subordinated 
debt and preference shares (usually with stock options or warrants), and convertible preference 
shares. The term mezzanine financing is best understood as the middle floor between the top floor 
of debt and the bottom floor of equity. The three most popular forms of mezzanine financing are: 
• Convertible Loans 
Typically unsecured, convertible loans are for a fixed period (at a fixed or floating rate of 
interest) with the right of conversion (at the option of the lenders) into ordinary shares 
(sometimes preference shares) at specified dates in the future. Otherwise the loan is paid off 
at maturity. Convertible loans are a good financing method for projects that might take 
several years to be profitable, but where the costs and time of development can be predicted 
with a reasonable degree of certainty, so that the lower cost during the development stage 
converts to a higher cost when the project is profitable. 
• Subordinated loans plus options 
In this case, a company issues debt with a “sweetener” to buy new shares from the company 
at a future date at a fixed price known as the exercise or strike price “the option”. 
• Preference Shares 
This most popular form of venture capital financing is a preference share, which rank above 
ordinary shares in terms of their claim on assets, earnings and dividends, but below creditors 
and lenders. Whilst preference shares normally pay a fixed dividend (usually cumulative) 
based on the nominal par value of the shares, “participating” preference shares can also 
participate in the ordinary dividend distributions. Preference shares may also be convertible 
into ordinary equity or redeemable like a debt instrument. 
Although these and other mezzanine structures have been used by Jamaica’s government 
owned development banks and the former private sector owned Trafalgar Development Bank, most 
of the time the equity conversion rights have not been meaningful. In the case of TDB, preference 
shares were typically issued without equity conversion rights at a “heavily subsidized” standard 
interest rate of 15%, which, for most of the 1990s, would have been a fraction of the risk free rate 
payable on Government securities. As a riskier instrument, coming after standard loans in terms of 
priority in the case of a default, to have been priced correctly i.e. without subsidy, a further 
substantial risk premium on top of prime corporate lending rate should have been added to their 
coupon rate. 
The issuance of preference shares through Jamaica’s financial markets has been very limited, 
to the point of being irrelevant in most instances, with a very small number of quoted issues 
Clearly, this presents Jamaica’s local development finance institutions (DFIs) with an opportunity 
to help develop the local financial market, by seeking to make these products available to local 
investors, thereby stimulating their interest in more structured financial products. For example, the 
DFIs could sponsor and underwrite the issuance and listing of preference shares, or better yet 
convertible preference shares, on the Jamaica Stock Exchange, providing transparency and a 
“demonstration effect” to the local private financial markets. If the shares were attractive 
investments, as opposed to investments that require marking down from par on the day of issue to 
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reflect the subsidy element, they could even be sold to raise further capital for the development 
bank. An effective way to achieve this might be through pooling and securitisation of a number of 
similar assets with the goal of a subsequent sale, either through a private placement (limited to 50 
investors under the Securities Act) or listing on the underutilized Jamaica Stock Exchange. 
Equity 
On the bottom floor of the building are the ordinary shareholders, who have voting rights, plus the 
right to receive ordinary dividends. When our development banks take equity ownership positions, 
they should have clear guidelines as to the maximum investment size, both in absolute terms and in 
terms of invested amounts. It should be noted that, while some institutions actively attempt to 
influence project management, most appear (mistakenly we believe) to have adopted a passive 
approach. In any event, there should always be a clear exit strategy for equity investment However, 
it is submitted that the most effective exit strategy is to have a formal venture capital fund, perhaps 
as a partnership between the state and the private sector. 
Venture capital – the way forward for development banks 
Venture Capital (VC) or more properly private equity (venture capital is really a form of private equity 
generally applying to start-ups) is just another structure to pool other people’s money (OPM) in the 
same fashion as occurred through the investment banks of Europe 150 years ago. Those investment 
banks provided both capital and crucially "entrepreneurship" for industrial latecomers (the equivalent 
of today’s developing countries) to catch up through the creation of new industries.  
(See Part 1). 
The emphasis on services in the Caribbean as industries in which we can be competitive means 
that, excluding tourism, there is much less in the way of collateral against which to lend. In the 
absence of the manufacturing plants prevalent in Germany’s industrialization, venture capital/private 
equity structures should be better financing structures than bank loans to mobilize the resources 
required to target modern industries. Such structures need not only to provide funding but crucially 
compensate for the entrepreneurial deficiencies of individual entrepreneurs in the region (about which 
we need say no more). Typically, development banks, which go this route create separate subsidiaries, 
no doubt reflecting the different mindset required – that of the entrepreneur/industrialist and not a civil 
servant. 
In addition to the correct mindset, the investment structure is extremely important. The 
investment bank of old made its real returns from equity (J.P. Morgan was no accident), and a VC 
fund is just another structure to link risk and reward properly, as opposed to the traditional regional 
development bank model of all risk and no reward. Without the big successes from new industry 
creation, the capital to fund further new industries is not accumulated, leaving these other potential 
new industries stillborn. 
What is venture capital? 
A good definition of venture capital (VC) is “The investment in the illiquid equity securities of a 
privately held business by third-party investors (OPM) seeking high returns, which reflect the high risk 
profiles of the companies and the near-term illiquidity of these types of investment. 
VC funds are typically managed by full time professionals, motivated mainly by the goal of 
producing capital gains, rather than current income. Venture capitalists expect the potential for a high 
rate of return in the businesses in which they invest – a minimum of 25% per annum compounded, 
whilst in fact targeting 100% per annum. This very high potential pay off is necessary because venture 
capital is a very high-risk business. Venture capitalists understand that, out of a portfolio of 8-10 
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investments, most are likely to lose all or nearly all the investment, some will perform in an average 
manner and only one to two investments will be the big winners that must pay for the other failures. 
This very high failure rate is the reason why banks do not do VC financing as, with their upside 
capped, they cannot charge enough in interest to compensate them for the risk of their lending to start 
up businesses. Bank lending is appropriate when a company is more established, with assets and cash 
flow to lend against rather than just an idea. 
VC is a harsh business, functioning on the basis of The Golden Rule -“ he who has the gold, 
makes the rules” and, as a consequence, entrepreneurs should only seek VC financing if they are 
prepared to give up between 20-50% of their business in return for such an investment. They should 
bear in mind however that it is better to have a smaller percentage of a lot, than the whole of nothing. 
In addition, entrepreneurs should expect several rounds of financing rather than being given a single 
large capital sum. This increases the investor’s control over the project, and accommodates the reality 
that different investors are comfortable with the different levels of risk associated with the stages of the 
investment. 
The venture capital cycle – an outline of the U.S. or U.K Model 
Pre- Seed Round 
In the “pre- seed” round where the entrepreneur just needs the money to start his business, 
entrepreneurs normally tap the traditional three F’s – friends, fools and family. This round can itself be 
further split into 
• initiation (creation of company with nominal funding split between partners), 
• commitment (founders invest more meaningful funds as they decide to commit themselves to 
the business possibly, although not necessarily, giving up their present jobs, 
•  extension (founders take on more partners to complement their skills),  
• the aforementioned 3 F’s, and professional (professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, 
agree to work for slice of the equity). 
The British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) has identified next four stages through which 
firms needing money to expand their business will go: 
• Seed Round 
The  “seed” round will allow the business concept to be developed, perhaps through creating a 
well formulated business plan, the basic elements of which would include: the executive 
summary, management, company, product or service, market, marketing program, numbers and 
competition. This is essential as one is now trying to persuade professional investors to finance 
the market research, or create the prototype necessary to get the company to the start up stage, 
where it can qualify for the next round of financing. 
• Start Up Round 
The Start up Round is when the funding to develop a company’s products as well as fund their 
initial marketing is found. Companies may be in the process of being set up or may have been 
trading for a short time, but may not have sold their product commercially. Often the presence 
of an “angel investor’’, defined as a wealthy private individual who invests in start ups, is of 
particular importance in this vital round of financing. This “smart money” can help the start up 
business to complete its management team, and finalise the business plan needed to get the 
company to the next stage of financing. 
• Next Early Stage 
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The next Early Stage or so called” first round” of financing follows the start up phase. 
Funding is to initiate commercial manufacturing and sales where the company has completed 
the product development stage, but may not yet be generating profits. It is at this stage that 
the company should either have a product or service that is commercially viable or at least 
sufficiently far along in development to interest an institutional VC fund.  
• Expansion 
Funding to grow and expand an established company – this second and final round of 
financing is where the company is seeking to finance increased production capacity, product 
development, marketing and additional working capital for its initial and subsequent 
expansion e.g. increasing receivables and inventory. At this stage, the company would be 
expected to be moving from loss to profit.  
Some authors (Plummer 1987) extend the number of stages before the real final “liquidity 
stage” of exit to a third round (profitable but poor cash flow),a fourth round (rapid growth 
towards liquidity point) and a bridge stage (requiring mezzanine investment). 
• The IPO or other Exit 
It is after the final round(s) that the company would typically do an IPO (initial public 
offering) on the stock market. An IPO normally requires profits although that requirement 
seemed to be waived during the “Dot Com” era. The other main exit route is another 
company already in or seeking to enter the industry. This provides an opportunity for the 
company to raise additional capital for expansion, and for the venture capitalist to turn his 
illiquid investment into cash, by converting it into a publicly traded equity security. 
How a venture capital company operates? 
Venture capital can be broken down into a simple five stage process: deal origination (identifying 
investments), screening (analyzing), evaluation (valuing), structuring (investing) and post 
investment activities (adding value): 
• Deal Origination 
Identifying investments is a critical element of venture capital investing. The main sources of 
deals are unsolicited cold calls, referral and active search. Successful entrepreneurs who 
know the venture capital game are probably the best source of deals. In Jamaica, there are no 
formal entrepreneurial networks, so using an institution such as the Jamaica Chamber of 
Commerce would probably be a good substitute. 
• Screening 
Given good deal flow, one will need to have a screening process, including size of investment 
(there is an implicit lower limit on investment size as it takes time to monitor). Maximum size 
is determined by the overall size of the fund (no more than 10% of the portfolio in any one 
investment), industry specialization e.g. technology, geographic location of venture (usually 
nearby as there is a need to meet management regularly), and stage of financing e.g. 
expansion phase. 
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• Evaluation of Investment 
This process is much more than just looking at the profit history, balance sheet and any 
security the company has. Whilst some less experienced VCs particularly emphasize the 
importance of management (they would rather have an A grade management team and B 
grade technology than the other way round), a U.S. study by Tyebjee and Bruno puts this 
factor only at number five in terms of priority. According to their telephone survey of 46 
venture capitalists and a detailed analysis of 90 investments made by 41 different venture 
capitalists, the number one criterion is market size, the number two criterion is product 
differentiation, number three is cash out potential, whilst number four is environmental threat 
resistance (e.g. obsolescence, barriers to entry). 
A more memorable way of defining points two and four is that the business should have an 
unfair and sustainable advantage in distinguishing its business plan from the 99 other 
business plans the VC receives e.g. making it the 1 in a hundred he funds. 
• Structuring the Deal 
For a start up, tranching the investment so as to focus entrepreneurs to reach the goals set out 
in the business plan is critical. Convertible preference share structures are good for later 
investments. 
• Post Investment Activities 
Venture capitalists can add value in a number of ways after the investment, including 
sourcing additional funds, acting as devil’s advocate, fostering the correct internal company 
climate (usually a combination of marketing enthusiasm and attention to costs), fostering 
credibility for the big sales (higher status VC helping out), exit mechanisms (negotiating 
support IPO etc), recruitment of founders and management (staff recruitment) and advising 
on legal protection (e.g. of intellectual property rights) or avoiding other costly mistakes. 
Private equity must be adapted to emerging markets 
More than 500 emerging market funds raised more than $50 billion in new capital between 1992 
and 1999. This new breed of international private equity funds were clones of their U.S. 
predecessors, with the same fund-raising, organization structure, investing, staffing, and exit 
strategies, usually planning to sell the investments at a profit through an IPO. However, this U.S. 
model has not worked well in most developing countries. One must therefore conclude that if 
private equity is the way forward then the model will have to be adapted if it is to work in emerging 
markets. The following Jamaican case study is worth looking at in some detail because of the 
lessons  which can be learned from it, which may give an indication of the nature of the adaptation 
required:  
The caribbean investment fund (CIF)  
There have been a number of attempts at Venture Capital in Jamaica, but they have not been 
particularly successful. The last and most high profile attempt was the Caribbean Investment Fund, 
nearly all of whose investors, of which a very limited number were private sector, were from 
outside the Caribbean. After a long gestation period, which began in 1992, it commenced operations 
in January 2000 at a time when the Jamaican stock market was very illiquid. Jamaica had just 
experienced one of the world’s worst financial crises in terms of percentage of GDP and,in 
consequence, there had been no Initial Public Offerings for almost five years prior to its launch. In 
fact, this IPO drought would only be broken nearly three years later. On the other hand, around this 
time, increased cross listing reflected renewed interest in a Caribbean Stock Exchange. Moreover, 
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the following two years (2003 –2004) saw a very substantial increase in regional, particularly 
Trinidadian, investment in Jamaican shares. Since then, despite much talk, the concept of a 
Caribbean Stock Exchange has not been significantly advanced.(For an appreciation of the issues 
surrounding moves to establish a Caribbean Stock Exchange - see Appendix7 - A Caribbean Stock 
Exchange – Charting the Way Forward)) Furthermore, the recent regional bear market, primarily on 
the Trinidadian and Jamaican stock exchanges, has not helped matters in regard to Caribbean stock 
market liquidity. A recent interview with CIF’s managers revealed that they had learned the 
following lessons from their experience at the CIF: 
• Liquidity  
The financial market scenario portrayed above brought home to them the fact that, whilst 
always important, the exit strategy becomes critical in illiquid stockmarkets such as those in 
Caribbean which, in keeping with other small emerging markets, lack opportunities for exit 
by IPO. Accordingly, it was critical that they “ buy right” as they would usually be compelled 
to sell to a local “trade” buyer at a keen price. Hence, initial overpayment would severely 
depress return. 
• The issue of control 
All the CIF investments were minority positions, mostly in family owned     businesses. 
Accordingly, detailed shareholder agreements and other performance triggers would be more 
important than in the U.S. In particular, this would be the case when dealing with private 
family companies, who may not have same objectives as the investor- for example, they may 
not even want to list!  
• Region has small market size 
As investments are in businesses almost all of which are serving the regional market, the 
businesses were seen as unattractive to overseas buyers due to the small market size of the 
region, thus reducing potential exit options. This problem was compounded by what investors 
perceived as high political and economic risk, particularly in Jamaica. Local investment 
money is therefore of critical importance. 
• The early stages 
The early stage venture capital investments in the CIF’s portfolio performed particularly 
poorly, leading to the conclusion that it is courting disaster to buy into businesses, which the 
investor does not fully understand, or which he has not subjected to detailed analysis. It is 
therefore essential advisers should be Caribbean based and have a full understanding of the 
region. 
The promotion of emerging market private equity – the case of Jamaica 
In the light of the above, drawing in particular from the CIF experience, the following guidelines for 
the promotion of Private Equity are put forward: 
• Investments must be export orientated (local markets too small) 
At least in the Caribbean where the domestic market size is too small, any new venture 
capital fund should seek to provide capital mainly to exporters, including SMEs targeting 
exports. This should encourage the creation of innovative products that add value, whilst 
simultaneously generating employment, spreading risk and stimulating changes in the 
Jamaican business culture and types of business model – in short providing entrepreneurship. 
39 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 193 A new approach to development banking in Jamaica 
• Local money and expertise 
It is of critical importance to have a suitable mix of investors, including substantial local 
equity. The local equity is best achieved through a mix of domestic private and institutional 
funds. The managing partners, the ultimate representatives of the investors, should be a 
multidisciplinary team, able to negotiate investments and add value, whilst also being 
creative and able to tailor solutions to problems. 
• Control and 24/7 information 
U.S. style ”Corporate Governance” requires a culture of profit sharing. In the absence of 
trust, control achieved through majority ownership may be a normal requirement. The ability 
to exercise shareholder rights is extremely important where the business is family owned. 
Quality financial information as to the status of the investment is critical. Without 
information, the private equity model simply does not work in emerging markets. This 
implies the necessity for strong, in situ, real time financial controls, designed to ensure that 
financial information is neither inaccurate nor one sided. The managing partners should also 
be professionals resident in the country, who understand both the culture and the local market 
realities. Finally, investments should normally be in areas in which the managing partners 
have both expertise and experience. 
• A public/private sector partnership 
The need for a public / private sector partnership reflects the critical importance of having 
“smart money”, meaning investors who would not only provide money but would also give 
advice, help to build the management team, and use their contacts to find business or 
additional financing - basically acting as a true partner. The planned expansion by the 
Jamaican government of business incubators across Jamaica is theoretically a good idea. 
These incubators are designed to provide business infrastructure for entrepreneurs with only 
an idea and little else. As such, they represent the ultimate in smart money. However, without 
proper partnerships with practising businessmen or so called business “angels”, these 
initiatives attempts may not bear as much fruit as the Jamaican Government would like. A 
good way to proceed might be for the Government to partner with the Jamaica Chamber of 
Commerce, using its islandwide network of regional Chambers as joint venture partners in 
creating these island wide business incubators. The directors of the regional chambers could 
then, hopefully, act as mentors and even as “business angels” investing capital in some of the 
incubating companies. 
New venture capital funds – a proposal  
It is submitted that it is an appropriate time to revisit the issue of creating one or more new venture 
capital funds for Jamaican business. Such funds should preferably be joint public/ private sector 
partnerships, hopefully with our local development banks leading the way as catalysts and sponsors. 
Indeed, the Development Bank of Jamaica would be a particularly good candidate to sponsor an 
exchange traded venture capital fund.These shares could be traded on the Jamaica Stock Exchange, 
which would allow different categories of investors to participate. 
Such funds’ investments would be of the “Mezzanine” type i.e. quasi -equity (loans that give 
the same benefits as equity capital, except that they have to be repaid) as well as preferred shares. 
These investments would be adapted to the cash flow and growth realities of the business, but 
would be paid back thereby providing competitive returns to investors. 
40 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 193 A new approach to development banking in Jamaica 
4. Executive summary and 
recommendations 
Lessons from history 
In Part 1 of this paper, we traced the history of development banks with 
the aim of identifying what lessons modern day development banks could 
learn from it.It quickly became clear from this analysis that the 19th 
century European development banks were established with the aim of 
solving exactly the same industrial development problems as modern day 
development banks are seeking to address i.e. the raising of long term 
finance for investment.These early development banks would have been 
regarded as investors in ventures of a pioneering nature whereas today, as 
the name implies, development banks would be regarded as financing 
“development”. This rather obvious distinction highlights a fundamental 
difference between the early development banks and those of today – the 
early banks raised long term investment finance for projects which were 
very high risk but also seemed to have the potential to generate high 
returns. Conversely, modern day development banks, particularly those in 
developing countries, seem to be prepared to take high risks without the 
prospect of high reward. This is what Kitchen refers to as the “Danger of 
Social Credit”. This appetite for risk without reward is particularly 
prevalent where the development institution is Government owned. 
However, as the case study of Trafalgar Development Bank illustrates, 
private sector development banks are not immune. 
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Gerschenkron draws attention to another fundamental difference between the early European 
banks and the modern development banks when he points out that, in addition to supplying finance, 
the German development banks were also a substitute for entrepreneurial deficiencies. He continues 
“ From their central vantage point of control, the banks participated actively in shaping the major – 
and sometimes even not so major – decisions of individual enterprises. It was they who very often 
mapped out a firm’s path for growth, conceived far sighted plans, decided on major technological 
and locational innovations and arranged for mergers and capital increases”. In short, the German 
investment banks actively participated in the entrepreneurial ventures, which they financed, in two 
significant ways: 
• they controlled the venture 
• they were heavily involved in the planning process and other major decisions. 
As the interview with the Development Bank of Jamaica makes clear, this is in sharp contrast 
to the “hands off” approach adopted by development banks today. Again, the section of the paper 
on Trafalgar Development Bank indicates that the “hands off” approach is not confined to the 
public sector owned development institutions. However, in TDB’s case, it is not entirely true to say 
that that it did not involve itself in the planning process. Indeed, as the study indicates, its Project 
Management team often actually put together the entrepreneur’s plans. Hence, TDB was in an 
excellent position to monitor and control- just like the 19th  century German banks. That TDB failed 
to do so may be attributed to the fact that its management and staff were imbued with the same 
hands off mindset, as obtained at DBJ. It may also be due to the fact that, unlike the German banks, 
it did not enjoy voting control of the venture,. Of course, as the study suggests, very little if any 
effort was made to acquire such control. 
Have development banks been a success? 
To answer the question “Have Development Banks been a Success?” the paper draws on not only 
the views of academics – Maxwell Fry and Kitchen – but also of several economists with years of 
practical experience in the field. In the view of one of the latter “hardly any development banks 
have been worthwhile and, in particular, have not made any meaningful contribution to financial 
market development”. He identifies the usual problems from which such institutions suffer as 
including : 
• Political interference, which results in loans being made to government supporters. 
• Below market interest rates, which crowd out private sector lenders. 
• High default rates. 
• Poor collection records. 
• Government bail- outs on a regular basis. 
The above views are in line with those of the other economists who have worked in the field. 
However, a point worth noting is the observation that “the only thing that has a chance of working 
is when the state owned development bank limits its operations to second tier (wholesale) lending, 
and channels the funds through the commercial “first tier” banking system.” Inevitably, the above 
views prompt the question “Is the concept of a Development Bank fatally flawed.” In answer to this 
question, the paper concludes that the development banking concept is indeed fatally flawed. In 
brief, it cites the reason for this as the impossibility of operating a successful financial institution on 
the principle of “high risk, low return”. Clearly, the principle is in sharp contrast to the  “high risk, 
high return” principle adopted by the European banks. Less obvious is the other fatal flaw in the 
principles on which modern day development banks operate i.e. their “hands off” approach, rather 
42 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 193 A new approach to development banking in Jamaica 
than following the German Banks principle of sharing the entrepreneurial role with the entrepreneur 
being financed. 
The Jamaican experience of development banking 
Part 2 of the paper “The Jamaican Experience of Development Banking” examines the modus 
operandi of all Jamaica’s post - Independence developmental institutions. These analyses bring into 
sharp relief the fatal flaws in the principles adopted by these institutions. In other words, the 
Jamaican experience substantiates the conclusions as to the desultory performance of development 
banking in the developing world, which were arrived at in Part 1 of this paper. 
Financial deepening in Jamaica 
In the light of this, Part 3 of the paper, entitled “Financial Deepening in Jamaica”, seeks to address 
the question “how to rectify this situation” Accordingly, it considers first how Jamaica’s 
development banks might access the international capital markets and hence raise fresh capital in 
the same manner as their counterparts in developed countries. A condition precedent to such a step 
would be the need to “clean up their balance sheets”. However, it should be borne in mind that it 
would be impossible to keep their balance sheets clean, operating on the high risk/ low return 
principle. In making suggestions for the expansion of the range of financial products offered by the 
development banks, the paper points out the need for legislation to make it easier to transfer 
financial ownership to creditors and for the establishment of a credit bureau to improve access to 
financial information. 
The paper notes that, with the switch to “second tier” lending, the Jamaican development 
banks standard loan portfolio has been insulated against “borrower default”. However, it questions 
whether this policy will not simply result in commercial banks using the development banks funds 
to finance projects which they would have financed anyway- thus achieving no incremental lending. 
It therefore suggests that development banks focus on market rate loans, perhaps coupled with 
grants for technical assistance. 
A number of new financial products are identified : Syndicated lending or Co- Financing, 
Securitisation and Structured Finance, Debt Securitisation, Factoring etc. Moreover, to illustrate a 
proposal that Jamaica’s main development bank assume the role of a corporate financier, it likens 
the institution to a multi-story building, each of whose floors represents a particular level of appetite 
for risk. Thus, the top floors represent “secured debt” whilst, at the other end of the scale, the 
ground floor represents equity. The intervening floors represent “Mezzanine or Quasi Equity 
Financing” including commercial loans, preference shares etc. 
The way forward for development banks 
This illustration sets the stage for what the paper argues is “The Way Forward for Development 
Banks”. In short, the proposal is that the development bank should switch its modus operandi to that 
of a Venture Capital Corporation (VC). In effect, what is being proposed is that the development 
banks should “go back to their roots” and follow the principles adopted by the early European 
banks, namely: 
• Only invest in high risk ventures when there is a prospect of high return. 
• Seek to exercise control over such ventures. 
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• Share the entrepreneurial role with the entrepreneur by getting involved in the planning 
and deal making processes. 
To be able to function in this manner, the VC itself would need to be managed by full time 
professionals, who are resident in the country, and who understand both the culture and local 
market realities. Such professionals would be  motivated by the goal of capital gains as high as 
100%. This very high potential pay off is necessary because, out of a portfolio of 8-10 investments, 
there will be only one or two of the big winners needed to compensate for the losses. Moreover, 
these professionals seek to control the businesses in which they invest, working on the principle of 
the Golden Rule i.e. “he who has the gold, makes the rules”. It is envisaged that such control would 
be exercised largely by means of a system of “24/7 Financial Information”. In adapting Venture 
Capital/Private Equity to Emerging markets, such as the Caribbean, such a control system is 
regarded as a pre-requisite. In addition, the mix of investors should include substantial local equity, 
which   would best be achieved by a mix of domestic private and institutional funds. It is  suggested 
that the DBJ would be a particularly good candidate to sponsor such funds.It is also noted that 
listings would constitute an added incentive to prospective investors because it would provide them 
with a ready made exit strategy. 
In closing, it is perhaps appropriate to observe that the drafting of the paper has been driven 
by the conviction that what is needed to finance investment in developing countries is “not more 
loans, but more equity!”. 
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Appendix 1: The private sector development programme (PSDP) 
The PSDP is a four-year €28.67 million technical assistance programme financed jointly by the 
European Commission via the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) and the Government of 
Jamaica (GOJ).  The PSDP’s objective is “to enhance the perspective of socio-economic 
development through strengthening of the private sector in the challenging context of globalisation 
and the liberalization of the economy.” 
The purpose of the programme is “to increase the private sector’s contribution to GDP, and 
more specifically, the contribution of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) sector.” 
The programme intends to achieve this “ by addressing competitiveness challenges and constraints 
at policy and regulatory levels; by enhancing MSME competitiveness via firm-level assistance; and 
by strengthening the support provided by MSME representative organizations. There are 12 PSDP 
components, those relevant to this paper being the Corporate Finance Brokerage and the proposed 
Mutual Guarantee Company (MGC) that are aimed at increasing MSME access to corporate 
finance.  
Corporate finance brokerage - background 
It is expected that growth in Jamaica in the coming years will have to be largely export-led. To 
realise such export-led growth requires improving the competitiveness of the private sector, 
involving cost reductions and investments in restructuring in favour of more competitive activities. 
As interest rates are trending down, factors limiting access to credit, such as strict collateral 
requirements, may become an important obstacle to investment growth, especially for micro, small 
and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs).  Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) also face important 
internal constraints in terms of management, technology, product quality and marketing capability. 
An emerging challenge is also the need to meet quality and environmental standards at the main 
export markets, as well as certification requirements. 
Against this background, the private sector in Jamaica faces numerous developmental 
constraints, notably in the evolving context of globalisation and the opening of the economy, which 
put pressure on firms to adapt to increased competition at home and on foreign markets.  
Notwithstanding, Jamaica presents a wide spectrum of development opportunities, both on the local 
and export markets. However, in order to develop and compete, businesses need simultaneous 
access to finance and business development services to enhance chances of success. 
Corporate finance brokerage services  
One of the major impediments to MSME access to bank loans in Jamaica is the inability to present 
viable business plans and to meet the collateral requirements set out by the lending institutions.  
The Corporate Finance Broker is a PSDP activity aimed at helping enterprises to gain access 
to broad(er) corporate finance services from the formal financial sector. A budget of €270,000 in 
grant resources has been allocated to this activity. JAMPRO, as the executing PSO, is expected to 
contribute a total of €200,000, in implementation costs, and MSMEs at least €19,000, for services 
provided by the CFB. 
The project involves the delivery of financial advisory services to qualified micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises.  It also involves the provision of assistance with the delivery of training 
seminars/workshops on financial matters in order to improve the technical capacity of MSMEs in 
that area. In addition, assistance with the assessment of applications to the PSDP will also be 
required. 
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Target groups 
The main target group is comprised of the locally-based Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 
including formal micro enterprises that need assistance in accessing corporate finance from the 
Jamaican financial and/or capital markets. 
Specific activities 
• Carry out at least preliminary diagnostic assessments of MSME clients who are eligible 
for CFB assistance including companies that have been awarded grants under the PSDP 
cost sharing facility and reach agreement with these clients on the nature of assistance to 
be provided under this Activity; 
• In collaboration with other service providers to the PSDP, operate as an assessor of 
applications submitted to the PSDP by means of the Call for Proposals (CFP) mechanism 
for certain PSDP Components, namely: Cost Sharing Business Development Services 
(BDS), PSO Capacity-Building and Consortia Business Development Services (BDS) 
activities;  
• Provide financial planning and restructuring advice to MSME clients of the CFB; 
• Identify appropriate sources of finance for MSME clients of the CFB; 
• Delivery of financial assistance focussed workshops and seminars targeted at MSMEs;  
• Marketing and promotional activities of the CFB 
• Development of templates for diagnostic assessments of potential CFB clients that will 
allow the CFB and the contractor to determine the type and level of technical support to 
be provided to MSMEs who meet the criteria for CFB assistance;.   
• Development and maintenance of constructive working relationships with stakeholders 
and other service providers involving the following: 
1. Procurement of the following business advisory services from a CFB outsourced 
provider: 
− financial restructuring advice  
− business proposal preparation 
− identification of appropriate sources of finance 
− deal brokering 
− accounting assistance 
− financial management assistance etc. 
2. Delivery of financial assistance services to the MSMEs that have been referred to the 
programme and who meet CFB eligibility criteria 
3. Delivery of workshops and seminars to MSMEs on select financial management 
topics 
4. Identification, by other PSDP components, and, via Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), referral by financial institutions of those MSMEs who could benefit from 
CFB services 
48 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 193 A new approach to development banking in Jamaica 
The CFB targets are as follows: 
1. 400 firms assisted by the programme 
2. 100 loans facilitated through individual assistance 
3. 400 loans facilitated (in conjunction with Mutual Guarantee Company) 
4. 48 workshops and/or seminars conducted for SMEs 
Assumptions underlying the project intervention 
Assumptions underlying project intervention: 
• Viable options & sources for financing exist; 
• Sustained collaboration with stakeholders and partners (financial institutions, PSDP); 
• Commitment of MSMEs to pay fees; 
• Commitment of MSMEs to attend workshops 
• Adequate financial resources to successfully execute project and contract 
 
Risks 
In consideration of the assumptions above, the risks associated with this contract are: 
• Financial resources may prove inadequate to execute all activities; 
• Inadequate support from stakeholders undermine success of Brokerage 
• Inadequate commitment from beneficiaries to contribute and attend events 
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Appendix 2: Guarantee funds 
A Guarantee fund gives incentives to qualified, approved financial intermediaries (AFI’s) involved in 
SME lending by providing additional coverage for loans which would normally be rejected for lack of 
collateral. These range from all-risk guarantees (whereby the guarantee agency e.g. the development 
bank covers the lender against default regardless of the cause) to partial risk -specific guarantees 
(covering default arising from specified events). 
The main theoretical justification for guarantees is to develop domestic financial markets by 
allowing companies to take out loans at more attractive terms with domestic lenders through providing a 
guarantee to remedy the general lack of collateral of SME’s, potentially increasing the supply of 
subordinated loans and mezzanine capital most frequently through fund structures, and generally 
increasing the tenor and quantum of loan financing for those already able to access debt financing. 
The National Commercial Bank of Jamaica is one of two domestic commercial banks in Jamaica 
(the other one being Trinidadian headquartered RBTT) currently operating a loan guarantee scheme (the 
guarantee being provided by U.S. AID). The following questions were put to NCB, who replied as 
follows. 
Question: How is your loan guarantee scheme with USAID 
working? 
Answer: In May 2006, NCB launched its SME Development Access Facility, in partnership with the 
USAID, through their DCA line. The facility allowed SMEs to: 
• Access bank funding in cases where there may be collateral constraints. 
• Access funding below market rates. 
• Become more competitive within their markets. 
Under this agreement, USAID guarantees up to 50% of the portfolio of this special credit facility. 
To date, the interest has been very strong, with disbursements at 50% of the credit line. 
Question: Generally how is lending to SMEs going and the 
problems in lending to SMEs in Jamaica 
Answer: Particularly through innovative credit products and focus on the SMEs, NCB was able to 
increase its lending to just over J$2.2B to this segment last financial year. 
Some of the factors that contribute to SMEs experiencing difficulties in accessing funding 
include: 
• Inadequate planning and research. 
• Lack of adequate financial information. 
• Inadequate resources ( including human resources). 
• No collateral. 
• Limited or inadequate funds to cover the equity portion of projects…..the financial institutions 
do not provide 100% financing. 
• Non compliance with regulators (including taxes). 
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As part of the PSDP project mentioned in Appendix 3, the EU funded the following study on 
the Mutual Guarantee Company concept. 
The mutual guarantee company (MGC) concept 
One of the major impediments to Small and Medium Enterprises receiving access to bank loans 
include their inability to meet the collateral requirements set out by the lending institutions.  To 
address the latter, a “Feasability Study for the Establishment of a Mutual Guarantee Company” has 
been undertaken by consultants Dr. Dieter Falk and Michael McMorris for ACE (Asesores de 
Comercio Exterior), which was completed on 30th January, 2006. 
The Mutual Guarantee Company, a concept developed in Western Europe, is a company 
founded by a number of enterprises with the objective to issue guarantees to secure bank loans and 
other business contracts. It targets only those enterprises that would not be able to get a loan without 
its assistance. 
All MGC share the same objectives to improve companies’ access to finance by providing 
guarantees, but they adapt to local legal, economic and social environment.  There may therefore be 
differences in their legal status, in their regulatory and tax provisions, in the way they operate, in 
particular in relation to banks, and in the type of enterprise they target.  Some target a single 
economic sector, others are multi-sector, with both types coexisting in the same country.  Some are 
closely dependent on their banking network, while others have looser relations with a number of 
banks.  They can be assimilated to a credit institution and controlled by the Central Bank, or be 
monitored by the Insurance supervision body. 
Often, as MGC’s members do not have the means to invest in the company, other 
shareholders provide the initial capital. This is a common feature even in developed countries.  
Moreover, the start-up costs of the company may be offset by a grant, as is proposed under this 
Programme.  Another characteristic of most MGC is that their founders generally include Chambers 
of Industry and Commerce, professional associations, banks involved in lending to the target 
members, and public entities, such as national or international development funds. 
Authors Dr. Dieter Falk and Mr. Michael McMorris conclude that 
• Jamaica could benefit from a properly structured guarantee structure for SME loans. 
• Guarantee Funds are inherently risk propositions and should not be undertaken without 
having an experienced, prudent, independent management and an adequate capital 
endowment able to withstand default ratios of up to seven percent. 
• The pace of the loan guarantees undertaken is critical to the long term viability of the fund 
and requires experienced personnel trained in non-traditional credit, treasury, and 
financial company management to oversee such a company. In the absence of hard 
demand figures, great care must be taken that the impact will be reached soon. 
• Any fund should not be structured without a specialised lawyer and tax attorney. 
• Respect for Guarantee Fund (GF) by the financial community which it will interact with is 
critical to its success. 
• The ability or mechanism to reach many small businesses, both formal and informal, is 
integral to the effectiveness of the GF on the economy. 
• The fund should not be undertaken by the central government nor openly promoted by it. 
51 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 193 A new approach to development banking in Jamaica 
• The introduction of a credit bureau in Jamaica and the acceleration of processes necessary 
for the realization of collateral could greatly expand the ability of the GF to be effective 
and sustainable. 
According to Falk/McMorris, international best practice usually foresees guarantee coverage 
of loans between 45% to 65% going up to 85% for start ups in some cases. 
They argued that the DBJ was the best government owned institution to administer such a 
fund. Private sector alternative lending routes to reach SME’s envisaged by the “Feasability Study 
included the Credit Union network (referred to in Appendix 5) or the creation of a new private 
entity – either a bank (not recommended) or a specific purpose company. 
According to Professor Maxwell Fry (pg 357) “The evidence as to whether guarantee 
schemes actually work in practice is ambiguous.” In his view “By not guaranteeing 100% of the 
loan, credit guarantee schemes save themselves from disaster. At the same time, however, this 
feature ensures that voluntary participation by private banks is insignificant in practice, precisely 
because the schemes apply specifically to high-risk lending.” 
Guarantee structures:  a description of OPIC funds 
OPIC mobilizes risk capital for emerging markets by providing, through guaranties, long-term debt 
capital to private equity funds. OPIC’s involvement often serves to encourage institutional investors 
who may not routinely invest in emerging markets to participate in such funds. OPIC’s support, in 
addition to the equity raised by fund managers from private sector institutions, is directly invested 
in private companies in emerging markets. OPIC provides in most instances approximately one-
third of the fund’s total capital. The debt is structured similar to that of a zero coupon bond: most of 
the interest expense is capitalized until the fund liquidates its investments, with the tenor often in 
parallel to the fund’s life, and repayment occurring in the later stages of a fund’s life. 
In addition to mobilizing capital, OPIC Investment Funds also support economic 
development by mobilizing expertise. OPIC-supported fund managers provide knowledge and 
experience to the companies in which they invest. These fund managers guide the strategic direction 
of portfolio companies, participate actively on company boards, and help companies recruit 
experienced operational managers. The result is enhanced productivity, reliable financial controls, 
improved corporate governance, modern business practices, and improved worker health and safety 
conditions. Fund managers also serve as active advocates for the improvement of the local legal and 
regulatory environment, protection of private property and shareholder rights, and the expansion of 
robust capital and financial markets. 
In general, the funds are organized by experienced sponsors of previous investment vehicles 
who raise the funds’ equity capital through private placement of equity interests with sophisticated 
institutional, corporate, and other qualified investors. Funds are typically managed by an affiliate of 
the sponsor(s) with a proven track record in direct equity investments, portfolio management, and 
relevant regional or sectoral experience. The fund manager is expected to add value to the portfolio 
investments by providing management expertise, improved marketing, and access to international 
manufacturing technologies, and to implement a coherent strategy for the eventual liquidation of 
investments. The fund manager typically becomes a voting member of the board of directors or 
other governing body of any company in which a fund invests. 
OPIC-supported funds typically are organized and structured like other private equity 
investment vehicles, i.e., as limited partnerships or limited liability companies. OPIC supplements 
private equity capital by lending long-term debt (typically with a 10 to 12 year maturity) to a fund. 
OPIC's new program standard generally limits the amount of debt to one-third of the private equity 
capital invested in the fund. OPIC receives commercially-based fees and a small profit participation 
component as compensation for the financing provided to the fund, and the program is structured to 
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ensure that fees and profit participation will fully cover costs and a modest return. In addition, 
OPIC’s terms allow the fund manager to make distributions pro rata along with the equity investors 
subject to certain covenants being met. 
Typically, OPIC financing will be provided to the fund in the form of a loan in which 
certificates of participation guaranteed by OPIC (and backed by the full faith and credit of the U. S. 
Goverment) are sold to “eligible investors” as defined in OPIC’s governing statute. In general, 
eligible investors include: U.S. citizens; U.S. corporations, partnerships, or the like which are more 
than 50% beneficially owned by U.S. citizens; and foreign entities wholly owned by U.S. citizens. 
OPIC requires either: 
1. that the fund manager or general partner be eligible investors, or  
2. a significant percentage of the limited partner capital of the fund (typically, an amount 
equal to 25% of the OPIC financing) be provided by eligible investors. OPIC does not 
offer any guaranty of the fund’s equity, and all equity investments in OPIC-supported 
funds are fully at risk, and subordinate to any OPIC lending. 
 
53 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 193 A new approach to development banking in Jamaica 
Appendix 3: The Jamaican credit unions 
Edited description of Jamaica Cooperative Credit Union League & National Association of Credit 
Unions situation from President Samuda’s speech of November 3rd, 2006. 
Credit Unions have been self-regulated under the aegis of the Registrar of Co-operatives and 
Friendly Societies for nearly sixty-five years. The Movement successfully weathered the hostile 
economic environment of the 1990’s financial crisis, with the contraction in the numbers of credit 
unions over the past decade being a deliberate strategy on the part of the Credit Union Movement, 
whilst increasing their membership base of over eight hundred and fifty thousand (850 000). 
The IMF in its March 2006 report on the Jamaican financial sector positively highlighted the 
role of the credit union movement as an example of the strength and diversity in the financial sector 
while arguing for institutional strengthening and closer more uniform supervision. With respect to 
regulation however, the IMF observed that “Planned Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) supervision of credit 
unions will also need to preserve the extensive outreach of credit unions to small savers and 
borrowers under an appropriately designed risk- based system” 1.  
According to the movement, Credit Unions have consistently outpaced growth in the general 
economy and projections are that this will continue. In terms of market share, the league argues they 
occupy more than 10% of personal savings and supply over 20% of personal loans. Membership 
growth is expected to continue growing at about 6% per annum. Deposits are expected to continue 
growing at more than 13% per annum and loans will grow at 12% annually. 
Credit Unions successfully secured a doubling of loan limits for unsecured credit. Instead of 
the originally proposed 5% of total loans, there is now acceptance that it will be 10%. Again, the 
IMF put it very well reporting “the proposed limit on unsecured credit would restrict credit unions 
that lend against moveable property and borrowers’ income flow, thereby potentially curtailing 
loans” . 
They believe however that planned regulations for a $20M minimum capital requirement (in 
place of the current situation of no requirement) for new credit unions could work against co-
operative interests, as it is would impede people coming together to help each other - the basic 
credit union philosophy - preventing the formation of new Credit Unions. 
The relevance of this to a paper on development banking is Credit Unions would appear to be 
one way of the best ways of increasing competition for lending and deposits, as well as one of the 
suggested intermediaries for the loan guarantee scheme. 
 
                                                     
 
1  International Monetary Fund  Financial System Assessment March 8 2006 Section 6 
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Appendix 4: The National Investment Fund Credit Facility 
In addition to the development banks in the Belize and the OECS countries, Jamaica has now 
adopted the controversial practice of borrowing from their national security schemes, in this case 
the National Investment Fund, with the recent creation of a Jamaican $1 billion National Investment 
Fund Credit Facility. As original proposed in the Prime Minister’s budget speech, the NIF credit 
facility was actually a micro –credit scheme. It now appears to have evolved into a loan facility for 
small business, an area that is not currently really catered for by the existing DBJ etc. 
The billion-dollar loan scheme, created  by Prime Minister Portia Simpson Miller from a 
drawdown on the National Insurance Fund (NIF), will offer loans of up to $5 million to debtors 
who, once acquiring the funds will pay no more than 10 per cent interest. The fund targets small 
operators. According to a ministry paper titled 'NIF credit facility for small and medium enterprises' 
presented at the official launch of the scheme, the funds will be disbursed through participating 
financial institutions which will be charged with the responsibility of managing the loans. These 
institutions will borrow the funds at four per cent interest but will be required to cap the rate 
charged to customers at the maximum retail rate of 10 per cent on the reducing balance. Borrowers 
will be afforded a maximum of six months moratorium on principal and interest payments as part of 
the repayment terms, which is capped at 48 months.The micro- small- and medium-enterprise 
sector, which employs well over 50 per cent of the work force, is the intended target market of the 
scheme, but will place particular focus on "enterprises involved in value-added activities."  
"These would include but are not limited to light manufacturing; provision of business 
services; agro-processing; and production of craft items," said the ministry paper. 
The Ministry paper advises, as is the normal practice for current development bank lending in 
Jamaica, that loans will be made to small and medium enterprises through an existing network of 
public and private sector financial institutions.  The NIF will not therefore be a direct lender, and 
the credit risk will be borne by the financial institution and not the NIF. 
The Ministry paper describes the NIF Credit Facility as a policy response to the needs of 
small and medium enterprises.  It adds that the entire Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Sectors, 
(MSME) employs well over 50% of the work force and are integral to an economic development 
model intended to ensure equity for all, and comes to the uncontroversial conclusion that “research 
indicates that Jamaica does not provide adequate and appropriate finance options for the small and 
medium enterprises.” 
The paper goes on to say that: “The NIF Credit Facility is well timed to support the 
development of small and medium firms, increase job opportunities for individuals with a range of 
skill levels and impact directly on community development.  The facility also comes at a time when 
other Government initiatives such as that recently launched by the Jamaica Business Development 
Centre, Business Incubator Services and the Ministry of Industry, Technology, Energy and 
Commerce planned establishment of Small Business Incubators island-wide.  The latter will provide 
much needed non-credit support for small enterprises. The wholesale rate, the rate at which loans 
will be made to the financial institutions is 4%, on the reducing balance. The maximum retail rate 
will be 10% on the reducing balance. The facility is initially for five years with built in reviews and 
impact assessments to guide further programme and policy decisions.” 
The NIF/CF/SME will make loans to a network of lenders hereafter referred to as Participating 
Financial Intermediaries (PFI). PFIs are established financial institutions that meet the requirements of 
internationally established ratios for lenders to the small and medium enterprise sectors. 
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An economist working for one of the major ”Multilaterals”  commented as follows on the 
proposed scheme: 
“In addition to the fiduciary irresponsibility of channeling funds either to pay actuarially 
unsustainable benefits or for special "social purpose" investments, such as the proposed micro-
credit scheme, the latter sets a potentially damaging precedent regarding the return on the Fund's 
portfolio.  Our understanding is that the "wholesale" rate of interest charged by the NIF to the on-
lending institutions will be capped at 4%. In recent years the NIF has earned interest rates triple and 
quadruple that rate. This is an unfair and hidden tax on the participants in the NIF pension scheme 
which if expanded for other similarly socially motivated uses of the resources could seriously 
undermine the long-run solvency of the Fund.  Ultimately the central government would have to 
bail out the NIF, further contributing to the fiscal deficit. 
Also worth mentioning is that the proposed credit program will undermine the market for 
micro - finance, as it will require administered passive and active rates for the program to be way 
below the current market rates, and the spread allowed to the participating intermediaries will 
be insufficient to cover their operating costs. If anything the program will be more costly for the 
retail intermediaries to administer than their other lines of credit, because it will require an elaborate 
non-price rationing mechanism, given that demand for funds will exceed supply at the subsidized 
on-lending rates proposed.     
Moreover, banks typically take funds like these and use them to lower their cost of funds 
without making any net new loans. There is substantial experience within the IDB, the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank and with other development institutions that substantiates the futility 
of schemes such as this and the harm they do to financial market development.” 
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Appendix 5: Focus on Improving the Business Environment in 
Jamaica 
From IDB Private Sector Assessment of Jamaica 
Establishing the Collateral Framework in Jamaica  
1. Conditions for Collateral Framework 
To understand what is necessary for establishing a framework for secured transactions, it is 
essential to understand the four economically important stages of being able to pledge collateral that 
can be used to secure loans.  Those stages are similar to those described in the section on pledging 
real estate, namely: 
• Creation.  The process by which the creditor establishes a security interest in a specific 
property (the collateral). 
• Priority.  This is the process by which the lender establishes the priority of the security 
interest. This step ensures that the collateral has not been pledged to anyone else. It 
requires the lender knowing whether any other security interest might have been filed and 
when the filing occurred. In the most modern systems, the date of filing is recorded along 
with the time. In Jamaica, a company charge is only effective when it is entered in the 
company file in the Company Registry and when a security interest is discharged, it needs 
to be noted in the company file in the registry. In addition, a separate registry for bills of 
sale exists, so that both the Company Registry and the Bills of Sale Registry must be 
searched to ensure that the lender has priority. 
• Publicity.  This is the process that makes public the priority of the security interest. This 
ensures that other potential lenders are aware of the security interest, thereby minimizing 
the possibility of disputes over the ownership of the collateral. 
• Enforcement.  This is the process by which, upon the debtor's default, the creditor will 
seize and sell the collateral to satisfy his claim. The cheaper this procedure, the more 
value can be placed on collateral. In modern systems, this process only takes days, which 
means that lenders can realize a high percentage of the value of the collateral that they 
hold. In systems that do not work well, it can take months or even years. Such delays 
greatly degrade the value of movable property as collateral. In Jamaica, enforcement of 
judgments is slow and difficult. An order must be obtained from the court, which in itself 
is not quick. Once judgment is obtained, the winning lawyer must notify the bailiff at the 
parish level. Since there is only one bailiff per parish, who also serves the Supreme Court, 
the process is very slow. Typically, it can take 4 to 6 months to receive an answer.  The 
net result is that lenders are forced to hold collateral many times the value of their loans. 
This raises the risks to borrowers as well – they stand to lose much more than the value of 
the loan. 
2. Effectiveness 
To work effectively, each of these stages must be effective before the secured transactions 
framework can be used reliably as security for lending. Although there are forms of 
collateral instruments available in Jamaica they are rudimentary and not easy to use, 
raising the costs of creating security interests. Some instruments that constitute standard 
forms of collateral in modern economies are not used at all in Jamaica. For example, 
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floating charges over accounts receivable are not taken by banks, excluding one of the 
largest assets of many companies from being used as collateral. 
3. Law of Bailment: 
• The UK Law of Bailment that predated 1961 is the law that governs warehousing in the 
country. This law, however, is outdated, and not suitable for modern practices. Similarly, 
ships mortgages, commodities bills of sale, crop liens, back to back financing are available 
under outdated English Common Law structures. However, they require lawyers to draw 
up individual instruments and examine the law to ascertain what is permissible. As in 
many other Caribbean countries, high quality legal expertise is expensive, so the cost of 
creating security interests is high. 
4. Access to Pledging Capital: 
• A further problem is that sole proprietors have little access to pledging collateral other 
than using Bills of Sale financing. Lenders indicated that they generally were not prepared 
to accept significant exposure under this instrument. In practice, therefore, the majority of 
businesses in Jamaica are excluded because they are sole proprietors. 
Reforming the Collateral Framework in Jamaica 
5. The collateral framework is outmoded and does not serve the needs of business. 
Jamaica’s laws do not meet the necessary conditions that would allow for the inexpensive 
and predictable use of movable property as collateral. The framework for lending that 
meets the standards for creation, priority, publicity, and enforcement of security interests 
is not in place. While it is possible to use some forms of collateral, the process is costly, 
inefficient and risky to lenders—the existing framework does not permit the effective use 
of collateral as security for loans. These shortcomings have significant adverse economic 
consequences for Jamaica, by inhibiting the development of comparative advantages in 
such areas as agriculture, services and tourism, resulting in a loss of potential high value 
export opportunities. The current system inhibits the growth of businesses, prevents 
commercial opportunities from being fully exploited and especially disadvantages the 
poor among the Jamaican population who wish to operate as sole proprietors. The 
difficulty of purchasing equipment on credit harms productivity and inhibits growth. 
The authors therefore recommend that the IDB assist the government in a reform of the 
collateral framework in Jamaica. Technical assistance would help reform 
comprehensively the legal, regulatory and technical framework for secured transactions. 
The outputs of the proposed TA would be: 
An in depth analytical study of the legal framework for secured transactions, emphasizing 
the economic problems arising from features of the present laws and the potential 
economic gain from proposed reforms. 
A legal and regulatory framework for secured lending, involving a new secured 
transactions law, an electronic transactions law, and abrogation of all legislation that 
might impinge on the ability to pledge collateral effectively. 
Reforming the system for the repossession of collateral in the event of a default, 
including more effective repossession, as well as protection to ensure that unscrupulous 
lenders did not repossess assets to which they are not entitled. 
An Internet-based notice filing archive, supplied on a turnkey basis. 
The technical and administrative regulations governing the Internet-based notice filing 
archive for security interests. 
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A supplemental program for capacity building, public awareness building, and 
monitoring support. 
A revocation of those sections of the Financial Institutions Act that prohibits the sharing 
of information on borrowers. 
Establishing the legal foundations for the operation of credit bureaus and the sharing of 
financial information. 
6. There have been many attempts at such reform in other countries, most of them unsuccessful. 
Legal analysis without corresponding analysis by economists of reform suggestions has 
failed in most countries in which they have been tried. Internationally known legal practice 
may not represent best economic practice. In many places, model laws have provided the 
foundation for attempts to reform the collateral framework. However, fiddling with model 
laws is often much less desirable than rewriting laws from scratch. 
7. A good project requires close coordination between the economists, international 
lawyers, local lawyers, and technical experts.  Local lawyers perform crucial functions 
both at the first stage, in research, and in the second stage, explaining the work to other 
local people.  Failing to integrate the local lawyers and the international experts can only 
produce poor results. The international experts cannot make sensible recommendations 
without considerable input from the local lawyers, so it is futile to depend on the 
international experts to rescue the work at the end. Furthermore, leaving legal drafting 
only to lawyers is a common donor practice but it is almost always a mistake. Economists 
and technical experts should be involved from the outset of the project, collaborating 
with lawyers in a diagnosis of the issues and elaborating drafting options. 
8. Examples of successful reform do exist and serve as a model of what could be done in 
Jamaica. A recent reform of the secured transactions framework in Romania has 
transformed Romania’s lending environment by facilitating the use of collateral as 
security for lending, not only from the banking system, but also from equipment 
suppliers, wholesalers, and agricultural suppliers. There were many similarities between 
the Romanian financial sector before this reform and that in Jamaica – severe financial 
underdevelopment, inability of a large sector of the economy to access credit, and a 
distrust of banks.  
9. The secured transactions reform in Romania tightly integrated diagnosis, and the drafting 
of the laws and regulations and is one of the main reasons for its success. This 
methodology has rarely been followed in reform efforts elsewhere. Even in the United 
States, reforms of the collateral framework have proved to be much more expensive than 
they needed to be.2  
10. Informing a technical assistance project of this nature would be a philosophy that would 
reverse many procedures that are common in the public sector in Jamaica. Such practices 
would be abjured that involve:  
                                                     
 
2  The State of Maryland reformed its secured transactions law, but left in the unnecessary condition that original documents had to be 
filed. This necessitated the development of a very expensive scanning system in order for the system to be accessible on-line. The 
final cost was over $10 million, compared with substantially less than $1 million for the Romania reform. 
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11. These steps would go a substantial way towards promoting further development of the 
financial market in Jamaica. 
• Creating forms asking for unnecessary information that is not required by the law. 
• Refusing action until unnecessary information is supplied. 
• Failing to collect information that the law requires and that creditors need. 
• Delaying the process by reviewing documents for authenticity or correctness. 
• Imposing excessive fees to raise revenue beyond the actual needs of the archive. 
• Using complicated fee structures with no basis in the law and that discourage credit. 
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Appendix 6: Improvement in access to financial information 
Caricris - Improving access to the regional capital market 
New Regional Rating Agency CariCRIS could be critical to improving access to regional capital 
market for corporates. This is an abridged version of Gleaner article on seminar/interview with CEO 
Venkat Raman. 
The Caribbean’s first regional credit rating agency, the Caribbean Information and Credit 
Rating Services Limited (CariCRIS), formally launched operations in Jamaica at a seminar on 
Wednesday October 12, 2005. CariCRIS is widely held, with a shareholder base including central 
banks, multilateral agencies, commercial banks, insurance companies, brokerage houses, mutual 
funds, a stock exchange, and India’s premier rating agency CRISIL, now majority owned by U.S. 
rating agency Standard and Poors. 
The initiative is focused on fostering an integrated, vibrant Caribbean capital market by 
supporting the development and integration of regional debt markets in the Caribbean. 
Mr Keith Duncan, President of the Jamaica Security Dealers Association (JSDA) gave a 
market players’ perspective on the utility of credit ratings.  He said, “as a key stakeholder in the 
financial markets of Jamaica, the JSDA fully supported the idea of a regional credit rating agency 
and saw it as another important step towards the full integration of regional bond markets”. 
Minister of Finance Omar Davis commented “CariCRIS could not have come at a better time 
in the context of the growth of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy.  The benefits of credit 
ratings are well–established and the introduction of regional credit ratings will help to further 
promote the regional capital markets.”   
He further added, “that for investors and issuers this initiative would benefit them by 
committing them to a higher degree of financial discipline and transparency in the market place. For 
credit institutions such as banks, this will mean a transition towards rating-linked credit decisions, 
with lesser emphasis on other features such as guarantees”. Adding a word of advice to the rating 
agency, the Minister added, “in achieving its objectives CariCRIS would also have to establish its 
own credibility through the quality of its ratings.  In this vein, Minister Davies noted that the 
governance architecture that CariCRIS has adopted with the separation of the Board and Rating 
Committee functions was a step in the right direction.  
Chairman of CariCRIS, and former Group CEO of RBTT, Mr. Terrence Martins, stated that 
the availability of “Regional Scale Ratings will facilitate a greater depth of locally relevant credit 
information and a higher degree of differentiation in the creditworthiness of regional issuers than is 
possible on the global rating scale used by global rating service companies.  This is because global 
scale ratings available today in the Caribbean are few and most of them are bunched at the lower 
end of the scale.”  
Mr. S. Venkat Raman, the CEO and Chief Rating Officer of CariCRIS, explained further “All 
ratings are relative. For a US or UK based investor with worldwide investment choices, the Global 
rating provided by Standard and Poors and Moodys is more relevant.” For this type of investor, the 
fact that all Jamaican investors will be B or B- due to the sovereign country rating limit is not a 
problem. 
However, in looking at a company such as a Grace Kennedy with a significant degree of 
assets as well as most importantly cash flows outside of Jamaica, a regional scale rating would 
provide much more information as to its better credit profile. 
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Mr. S. Venkat Raman believes there is a need to go beyond a regional to a local rating scale. 
“As long as there is a market for issuers and investors in local currency e.g. Jamaican dollars, then 
you will need a national scale. You need to be able to distinguish the creditworthiness of the 
Jamaican Government from that of a Lascelles, who would in turn also need to distinguish itself 
from that of a smaller or medium sized Jamaican company. 
At the seminar, Mr. S. Venkat Raman had commented “Institutional investors, such as 
National Insurance or Social Security Boards, Trust Funds, Pension funds, Money Market funds 
and Insurance companies, which handle large amount of public funds and have a fiduciary 
responsibility to do judicious investments, can now do a better evaluation of credit risk and secure 
their investments by asking for a credit rating before they invest. Before CariCRIS this was really 
not an option available to them.”  He argued that the key goal of CariCRIS was to protect investors 
by changing the investment culture to make it more risk sensitive. In his view “Crises happen when 
you put a lot of emphasis on name based lending”. 
Mr. Raman agreed with this analysts view (Keith Collister) at the time that “The widespread 
issuance of commercial paper could come back on the back of ratings, assuming regulatory 
approval”. 
A credit bureau would increase access to credit in Jamaica 
Financial services are a key element of economic development. With relatively small loans, small 
businesses and the poor can leverage their ideas and hard work to develop viable businesses, 
generating incomes for their families and, in some cases, generating employment and income for 
others.  
Credit bureaus help the poor build credit histories that they can then use to shop around for 
the best and most appropriate financial services available, turning their reputation-defined in a 
formal credit history-into collateral to access financial services. As credit histories and credit 
bureaus develop, they facilitate other types of business transactions; for example, poor 
entrepreneurs can use their credit history as references for business relationships with suppliers and 
other business connections. 
Credit bureaus can help the poor use their good reputation to gain access to other services, 
such as telephones, that can improve their quality of life and, in some cases, their business 
opportunities. Depending on the data included and used in credit bureaus, they also facilitate 
business-to-business transactions and commerce. This is particularly important in countries where 
the pledging of collateral is difficult and expensive. 
Credit bureaus are being established in more and more markets, selling more information on 
more people to more firms. For those in the business of providing financial services to low-income 
populations, these institutions are critical - the information they collect on loan histories, bankruptcies, 
foreclosures, and criminal records enables banks, other financial intermediaries, and commercial 
enterprises to make informed decisions about individuals and businesses that may otherwise be 
considered bad risks. For lending institutions, credit bureaus can help increase access to client 
information, thereby lowering costs on loan appraisal, collections, and losses. They can increase 
competition for smaller borrowers, which expands access to credit and lowers costs on financial 
services for these traditionally underserved segments. When credit bureaus expand their databases and 
services to include sectors beyond banking-into utilities, telephone companies, and department stores, 
for example-they can facilitate expanded access to these service markets as well. The lack of credit 
information in Jamaica harms most those who do not have large private assets to pledge as security. 
Protecting “privacy” effectively harms many of those that this policy is meant to help. 
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Small businesses and low-income microentrepreneurs are the primary market segments that 
can benefit from the establishment and expansion of credit bureaus in developing countries. They 
allow people and firms to turn their reputations (credit and social history) into collateral for loans to 
finance businesses, home improvements, and consumer purchases and to respond to other 
opportunities and needs that require financial services. Borrowers can use their credit reports as 
substitutes for formal financial statements and traditional collateral to access loans usually 
unavailable from the formal financial sector. There is strong evidence from the US and elsewhere 
that access for lenders to timely credit information increases substantially the access to credit for a 
substantial number of households. 
The small business loan market is perhaps the segment of the credit market where asymmetric 
information [the gap in knowledge between lenders and borrowers] is most pronounced. 
Independent analysis of most small businesses is usually not available. Small businesses are also 
very diverse, so it is difficult to identify clear predictors of success. Further complicating matters is 
the fact that many small business owners mingle their personal finances with those of their 
company. In countries such as Jamaica, these problems are even greater due to economic volatility 
and widespread tax evasion. 
The traditional response of banks—the main source of untied credit for small firms—has 
been to put significant resources into studying business plans and cash flows and requiring 
collateral to back loans. This approach is time -consuming and results in high fixed costs, making 
many small business loans too costly to undertake. Credit registries which collect standardized 
historical data on borrowers can create a new kind of collateral—reputation collateral—which can 
help both in reducing problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Credit scoring technologies 
that make use of such data greatly reduce per-loan costs, thereby opening up new lending 
opportunities. Both data on small businesses and on their owners has proven to be relevant in 
determining the risk and profitability of small business loans.  
The empirical results in many countries confirm that credit registries contribute to more 
effective financial intermediation as evidenced by greater access to credit. In particular, the average 
debt/capital ratio for firms in countries where credit bureaus are used widely is higher and access to 
credit is greater than those countries where misguided privacy rules prevent the use of borrowing 
history. Countries with better developed credit registries enjoy lower financial restrictions than 
those where credit bureaus are underdeveloped. In particular, well performing credit registries can 
account for significant reductions in the sensitivity of a firm’s investment decisions to availability 
of cash flows. In Jamaica this translates into more lending for those to whom credit is unavailable – 
the small and the poor.  
It can be argued that this would be a much better policy direction than providing subsidized 
credit from the people future pensions. 
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Appendix 7: A Caribbean stock exchange – charting the way forward 
In his opening address to the participants of the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) Inaugural Regional 
Conference held at the Half Moon Hotel in Montego Bay in January 2006, former JSE Executive 
Chairman Roy Johnson set the tone for the key first session of the Conference “A Caribbean Stock 
Exchange – Charting the Way Forward” by suggesting the need for clear action steps to move the 
issue of a Caribbean Stock Exchange forward. 
Interminable gestation of caribbean stock exchange 
For Mr. Johnson, the conception and birth of a Caribbean Stock Exchange has experienced an 
interminable gestation. He addressed squarely the practical hurdles which militate against having 
one single Caribbean Stock exchange, the chief of which is the fact that the established Exchanges 
are not likely to apply for voluntary redundancy. 
A view from the Barbados stock exchange 
Mr. Marlon Yarde, General Manager of the Barbados Stock Exchange, argued that it was first 
necessary to define what was the objective of a single regional capital market, which he defined as 
meeting the needs of the Issuers, Investors and Intermediaries for predictability (particularly with 
respect to rules and legislation), cost-effectiveness,  transparency and fairness, and liquidity. He 
emphasized that foreign investors in particular would require predictability in investing across 
borders, and cited the example of the success of the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
in achieving the maximum possible harmonization of rules and regulations. 
Current reality 
The current reality was that there were seven small separate Caribbean stock exchanges – Bahamas, 
Barbados, Eastern Caribbean, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago, with relatively 
high transaction costs, low liquidity, a relatively small number of listed companies, and a few 
securities dominating trading on an exchange, whilst legislation and trading rules varied across the 
region. 
Liquidity 
In his presentation, Mr. Yarde, stressed the key importance of liquidity. He argued that the best way 
to achieve improved liquidity was a common trading platform approach, with CARICOM-wide 
connectivity using state-of-the-art technology connecting local brokers (intermediaries) in the 
multiple stock markets through a single network. This would create a fair and well-informed market 
for financial securities, and ultimately an internationally competitive market. By interconnecting the 
stock exchanges of the region in this fashion, he believes one would be able to create a single 
regional capital market. 
Issuers will still list on their home market, but brokers from throughout the region would be 
able to trade their shares through their local exchange. This removes the notion of a single exchange 
displacing the existing well established exchanges, whilst broadening the scope of operations of all 
exchanges as all participating exchanges will give their brokers access to the companies listed on 
each others boards. 
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This would encourage more companies to list because of the cost-effectiveness of the 
process. When a company does an Initial Public Offering (IPO) and subsequently lists on their local 
exchange, they now have the opportunity of making the IPO to the entire region because they know 
that when they list brokers throughout the region can trade their shares for their shareholders 
wherever they are in the single regional capital market. 
For Mr. Yarde, stock market integration meant : 
“Stock market integration means that investors can buy and sell shares in those markets 
without restriction and that identical securities can be issued and traded at the same price across the 
markets after foreign exchange adjustment.”  
Settlement 
Brokers will have a bank account with the settlement bank chosen through which settlement will be 
effected. Intra regional settlement will be by the use of a commercial bank that has a regional 
presence or via the all the participating Exchanges having a clearing/settlement account in the 
various regional central banks.  
Cross listing does not necessarily increase liquidity 
Mr. Yarde argued that once there is interconnectivity amongst the regional stock exchanges, there 
will be no need for the cross-listing of companies on different exchanges. In any case, he argued 
that there was a greater need for new product e.g. new listings. Mr. Yarde cited the example of 
Barbados in arguing that increasing cross listing did not necessarily increase liquidity. Although the 
Barbados Stock Exchange now has 26 listed companies, only 20 are local companies, and liquidity 
still remains very poor.  
Bias of debt over equity 
Mr. Yarde also stressed the importance of reducing the bias of debt over equity funding in 
encouraging greater participation by issuers e.g. small businesses and investors in our regional stock 
markets. Currently, interest costs can be applied against one’s tax payments, but not the costs of 
equity capital. In his view, dividends (or the equity cost of capital) needed a level playing field with 
interest in terms of its tax treatment to create a regional equity culture. 
Harmonisation still required 
A working group consisting of issuers, investors, intermediaries, regulators and stock exchanges 
should be established to bring about the integration of the trading rules, procedures and market 
practices of the participating exchanges. 
The Eastern Caribbean stock exchange (ECSE) view 
The vision espoused by Mr. Yarde appears to be somewhat at odds however with the vision of Mr. 
Trevor Blake, General Manager of the ECSE. Citing the forces of globalisation, Mr. Blake argued 
that liquidity appears to be becoming increasingly concentrated, with a major portion of global 
market activity being channelled into large regional centers, with the result that regional exchanges 
cannot expect to be immune to its effects.  Therefore, he believes that there must be consolidation in 
the industry leading to a single regional exchange which would have at least some critical mass to 
ensure the continued existence of a market in CARICOM. 
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A regional solution 
Mr. Blake argued that the solution to the call for a CARICOM wide single integrated exchange 
already existed in the Eastern Caribbean States regional exchange. The Eastern Caribbean Securities 
Exchange (ECSE) has already been successfully established as an efficient, transparent and 
accessible securities market that transcends national borders (the majority of the Caricom’s member 
states) and was according to him the first fully electronic regional securities market in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
• The exchange has the following key features:  
• a trading engine that has both a primary e.g. initial public offerings (IPO’s) and a 
secondary market platform continuing trading; 
• issuers, intermediaries and investors connecting from multiple locations across the region; 
• automated order processing that transcends national boundaries; 
• connectivity for market institutions via IP/VPN and by direct dial-up networking; 
• a dematerialised environment that allows for transfer of securities by book entry 
transactions; 
• a central registry that maintains and services shareholder records on behalf of issuers in a 
dematerialised environment and that has the capability to accommodate the needs of the 
Caribbean region; 
• confirmation of trades between direct market participants on trade date, and final 
settlement no later than T+1; 
• processing of all money settlements using SWIFT generated messaging; 
• market institutions that follow global norms such as those recommended by the CPSS, 
IOSCO and other international standards; 
• a uniform body of legislation (a regional securities act and accompanying regulations) that 
provides for market transparency, investor protection and minimization of systemic risk 
throughout the region; 
• an independent regional regulatory body, the Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory 
Commission (ECSRC), which is responsible for the regulation of all securities business 
and the registration, licensing, monitoring and surveillance of all market participants; 
• an on-line database system for regulatory filings by public companies and for access to 
historical market data; 
• an exchange owned by a broad base of regional institutional investors committed to the 
success of the market; 
• investor diversification across geographic boundaries to preserve and grow market; 
• interest and investments, and provide increased visibility for listed companies. 
Mr. Blake said these features were a result of the critical design choices that had to be made 
in order to surmount the geographic challenges of a multi-state jurisdiction, and lend themselves to 
replication across CARICOM. 
For example, security issuers domiciled in other jurisdictions and regulated by a recognised 
regulatory authority are permitted to seek secondary listing on the ECSE for publicly traded issues 
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that have a primary listing on another recognised exchange through an abbreviated filing affording 
all issuers of publicly traded securities in CARICOM States the opportunity to list on the ECSE 
without the duplication of extensive regulation and the related expense. 
Intermediaries (broker/dealers) licensed by non-ECCU regulatory authorities are also 
permitted to become members of the ECSE and to utilise its facilities. As brokers licensed by any 
recognised regulatory authority obtain ECSE membership and access the network via the IP/VPN, 
any investor anywhere in CARICOM will be able to have local access to the market for all 
securities listed on the ECSE. 
The other exchanges 
Ms Marlene Street- Forrest, General Manager of the Jamaica Stock Exchange, and Hugh Edwards 
appeared to have similar views to Mr. Yarde. Ms Street emphasized the importance of new 
products, whilst Mr. Edwards appeared the most forceful of the big three exchanges in rejecting the 
ECSE view in his presentation, coming as he did after Mr. Blake’s presentation. 
 
67 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 193 A new approach to development banking in Jamaica 
Appendix 8: Analysis of development bank lending in Jamaica 
 
Figure 1 

























DEVELOPMENT BANK OF JAMAICA APPROVALS AND DISBURSEMENTS  
(J$ MILLION) (2002 DISBURSEMENTS DISTRIBUTION IS ESTIMATED) 
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Figure 3 























DEVELOPMENT BANK OF JAMAICA CUMULATIVE APPROVALS AND DISBURSEMENTS 2001 – 2004 























The Figure below above shows the cumulative shortfall of approximately $2 Billion. What 
happened? Is there a long gap between Approval & Disbursement?. 
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Figure 5 
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DEVELOPMENT BANK OF JAMAICA ALLOCATION OF LOANS  
(J$ MILLION) EXCLUDING SPECIAL ROAD FUNDING 
 
Although the Loans to Road Rehabilitation show a steep rise in 2003 and 2004 the position is 
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Figure 8 



















SOURCES OF FUNDING 
As can be seen The Loan Portfolio roughly matches the source of funding for 2001 to 2003. 
However in 2004 there is a shortfall of $2 billion (Unpaid Interest Capitalised?) which could 
be the difference between the loans given for Road Rehabilitation and the Funding for same. 
LOAN PORTFOLIO 2001 2002 2003 2004 
AFI's 3 144 3 994 4 302 5 006 
PCB's 844 870 859 758 
Direct Loans 601 835 781 958 
Special Loan Programmes 3 179 2 456 2 625 1 699 
Infrastructural Loan  1 341 7 758 9 998 
 7 768 9 496 16 325 18 419 
FUNDING     
GOJ     
Ministr Agr + Mining 138 138 138 138 
CBI 30 000 23 333 23 333 23 333 
Int Fund Agr Dev 49 970 49 970 49 970 49 970 
IADB 136 212 55 487 55 487 55 487 
IBRD 935 219 738 902 872 031 945 616 
USAID 18 228 12 015 12 015 12 015 
Hurricane Rehab 4 500 4 500 4 500 4 500 
IFAD 39 543 39 543 39 543 23 851 
GOJ Debentures 694 453 664 731 748 956 812 962 
NIBJ 200 840 71 477 71 377 76 265 
 2 109 103 1 660 096 1 877 350 2 004 137 
LENDING AGENCIES     
MIDA 667 586 586 544 
USAID 3 056 3 056 3 056 3 056 
Int Fund Agr Dev 80 200 81 958 83 959 85 771 
IBRD 62 522 64 448 73 075 77 843 
IADB 58 013 58 013 58 013 58 013 
OPEC    305 029 
 204 458 208 061 218 689 530 256 
DIRECT BORROWINGS     
CDB 2 283 458 2 357 240 2 402 374 2 189 125 
BNS 270 714 220 714 170 714 120 714 
J WRAY 134 927 140 802   
EEC 71 910 74 037 104 342 122 172 
EID 997 308 890 483 948 585 908 370 
BNS Road  1 315 403 7 534 254 5 900 000 
NHT Road    1 079 221 
NCB Road    1 000 000 
DEV Bonds 896 819 2 524 464 2 524 464 2 019 572 
JDB 145 614 145 614 145 614 145 614 
IDB 400 25 105 105 
GOJ   18 18 
 4 801 150 7 668 782 13 830 470 13 484 911 
Total 7 114 711 9 536 939 15 926 509 16 019 304 
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Figure 9 
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF JAMAICA: MAJOR SOURCE OF FUNDS  







































































































































The Aggregate amount of non-performing Loans to Financial and Agricultural Institutions in 
2003 – 2004 was $944.7 Million (15%) as against 456.1 Million in 2002/2003 (12%). The figures 
for 2001-2002 are not available from the Annual Reports. 
In order to assess the performance of DBJ and its impact on the Jamaican Economy it would 
be of considerable assistance if the Annual reports were consistent in their content. 
Ideally they should present the following: 
• Breakdown of Approvals and Disbursements by Sector for each year  
• No of Approvals and Disbursements by Sector and by size of Project as was shown in 
2002-2003. 
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• Full details of non-performing Loans including those guaranteed by GOJ 



































NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK OF JAMAICA: PORTFOLIO BY SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF JAMAICA APPROVALS IN 2002-2003 
 Amount Nº Average 
Agriculture 333.30 198 1.68 
Agro-Processing 116.00 5 23.20 
Manufacturing 265.80 10 26.58 
Quarrying & Mining 75.20 2 37.60 
Basic Services 105.50 2 52.75 
Tourism 736.00 5 147.20 
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Figure 12 
NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK OF JAMAICA NET INVESTMENT  
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Table 3 
NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK OF JAMAICA INVESTMENTS 
($J Million) 
2002 2003 2004 
Achendown Newtown 
Development 
94.5 Achendown Newtown 
Development 
201.5 Achendown Newtown 
Development 
797.4 
Technological Solutions 6.5   Technological Solutions 1.8 
Pathway Technologies 150.0   Pathway Technologies 1.7 
Teleservices Jamaica 28.6 Wasi Art 0.1 Teleservices Jamaica 7.7 
TLP 150.0 Highgate Foods 18.6 Bloody Bay 100 
Proprieter Strata Plan 1.7 Western Cement 53.0 Swept Away 180.5 
Runaway Developments 0.7 Directline Telenet 2.0 TLP 22.5 
Heeva Limited 20.0 Advanced Digital 
Services 
9.0 Touchpoint Centres 3.9 
Grizzlies 18.1 Western Cement 0.3 Pathway Technologies 0.4 
Information Services 0.4   Mavisbank 8.4 
Runaway Bay 
Developments 
190.4   Blooming Things 0.5 
Pulse 12.0   TLP 0.0 
13 Investments 672.9 7 Investments 83.0 13 Investments 1 124.8 
 
In order to consider NIBJ and its impact on Jamaican Business the Figure below shows its net 
investment in the major sectors. As can be seen Tourism is the main beneficiary. 
The Accounts for 2002 through 2004 were examined and new investments noted. During the 
years 2002 through a total of $1,009 Million was invested in Achendown Newtown Development, 
part of the famous Sandals Whitehouse investment. This represents more than half of all new 
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